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The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in 
Removal Proceedings 
Jason A. Cade* 
Prosecutorial discretion is a critical part of the administration of immigration law.  This 
Article considers the work and responsibilities of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) trial attorneys, who thus far have not attracted significant scholarly attention, despite 
playing a large role in the ground-level implementation of immigration law and policy.  The 
Article makes three main contributions.  First, I consider whether ICE attorneys have a duty to 
help ensure that the removal system achieves justice, rather than indiscriminately seek removal 
in every case and by any means necessary.  As I demonstrate, trial attorneys have concrete 
obligations derived from statutory provisions, case law, and administrative guidance to seek 
legitimate objectives, take steps to ensure procedural justice, and exercise equitable discretion in 
appropriate cases.  Second, I argue that the removal system lacks serious structural features to 
ensure these obligations are met, and as a result, prosecutorial discretion and prosecutorial 
conduct vary significantly across and within jurisdictions.  Little prevents ICE attorneys from 
indiscriminately pursuing enforcement objectives at the expense of seeing justice done.  This 
matters today, more than ever, because of the categorical and categorically unforgiving nature of 
the modern statutory removal scheme and the risk of erroneous detentions and removals.  Third, 
the Article develops important parallels between ICE attorneys and criminal prosecutors, 
suggesting that the immigration system might borrow some of the administrative features 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The Executive Branch enjoys an unmatched degree of discretion 
in its enforcement of immigration laws against deportable noncitizens.  
This is so in part for doctrinal reasons:  while courts are reluctant to 
scrutinize enforcement decisions in all regulatory arenas,1 the United 
                                                 
 1. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-33 (1985) (articulating the judicial 
presumption against reviewing agency’s decisions not to undertake enforcement action). 
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States Supreme Court’s extreme deference to legislative and executive 
policy decisions in the immigration context renders selective 
prosecution challenges nearly nonjusticiable.2  There is also a systemic 
basis for the great discretion.  While congressional funding levels 
permit the removal of approximately 400,000 noncitizens per year, the 
current unauthorized population in the United States is estimated at 11 
million.3  There are also millions more lawfully present noncitizens 
who are potentially removable on the basis of criminal history and 
immigration violations.4   When the pool of potential targets for 
enforcement dwarfs the government’s resources, discretion inevitably 
comes into play, whether at the macro level of setting policy or the 
micro level of implementation in individual cases.  Indeed, the Court 
observed recently that enforcement discretion is a “principal feature” 
of the immigration system.5 
 While every presidential administration since the enactment of 
the first exclusion and deportation laws has developed its own 
priorities for the deployment of enforcement resources,6 a number of 
developments have thrust the role of immigration prosecutorial 
discretion into the spotlight.  These include the rise of state and local 
participation in the removal system,7 the Department of Homeland 
Security’s (DHS) high-profile establishment of tiered priorities for 
                                                 
 2. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489-92 (1999) 
(rejecting the challenge to selective enforcement of immigration laws based on constitu-
tionally protected associational activities); Carranza v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 
277 F.3d 65, 72 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Court has made it plain that no general constitutional 
right exists for an alien . . . to review prosecutorial deliberations in order to forfend 
removal.”); see Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 
628-30 (2006). 
 3. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to All ICE Employees, ICE 
(Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf 
(stating that the immigration system can process only about 400,000 of the estimated 11 
million undocumented persons in the United States per year); Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera 
Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population:  National and State Trends, 2010, PEW RES. 
CENTER 9 tbl.2 (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf (showing the 
estimates of the unauthorized population fluctuated between 10 and 12 million between the 
years 2004 and 2010). 
 4. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 5. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012). 
 6. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 
119 YALE L.J. 458, 511-21 (2009) (explaining that executive immigration enforcement 
priorities have shifted over time, as illustrated through various administrations’ policies 
targeting criminal justice systems, workplaces, or private homes). 
 7. Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion:  The Rise of State and Local Power over 
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557 (2008). 
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immigration enforcement,8 and the Obama Administration’s decision 
in 2012 to categorically afford temporary reprieves from deportation to 
undocumented youth who meet certain criteria.9 
 Such events have sparked a burgeoning literature on the role of 
prosecutorial discretion in the immigration removal system.  Most 
scholarship in this area focuses on the propriety of the Obama 
Administration’s categorical enforcement priorities.10   Others have 
explored the influence that nonfederal actors have on the 
implementation of those priorities, for example, through state and local 
immigration arrests11 or through the choices prosecutors make in the 
criminal justice system.12  This Article contributes to this literature by 
                                                 
 8. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, ICE, to All ICE 
Employees, ICE (June 30, 2010), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2010/civil-enforce 
ment-priorities.pdf (setting forth the agency’s priorities for removal in light of limited 
resources). 
 9. See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-
action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last updated Oct. 27, 2014). 
 10. See, e.g., Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 6, at 511-21 (explaining that Congress, 
through legislation that vastly expands the population of deportable noncitizens in the United 
States, has conferred de facto discretionary authority to the Executive Branch to determine 
which deportable noncitizens to pursue); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On:  
The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and 
the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781 (2013) (arguing that categorically extending 
deferred action to qualifying undocumented youth violates the President’s duty to execute the 
laws faithfully); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in 
Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243 (2010) (analyzing historical antecedents of 
deferred action policies and exploring parallels between prosecutorial discretion in criminal 
and immigration law); David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion:  
The Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, YALE L.J.F. 167 (Dec. 20, 
2012), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/a-defense-of-immigration-enforcement-discretion- 
the-legal-and-policy-flaws-in-Kris-Kobachs-latest-crusade (arguing that Executive Branch 
determinations about immigration enforcement priorities, including categorical deferred 
action programs, are supported by statutory authority and policy grounds); Shoba Sivaprasad 
Wadhia, Response, In Defense of DACA, Deferred Action, and the DREAM Act, TEX. L. 
REV. SEE ALSO 64-66 (2013), http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/Wadhia.pdf 
(arguing that the DACA prosecutorial discretion program is legally justified). 
 11. Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment:  Immigration 
Status and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1433-37 (2011); Hiroshi 
Motomura, The Discretion That Matters:  Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local 
Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1848-58 (2011) (explaining 
how developments in immigration enforcement allow state and local decision makers to “act 
as gatekeepers, filling the enforcement pipeline with cases of their choice”); Jason A. Cade, 
Policing the Immigration Police:  ICE Prosecutorial Discretion and the Fourth Amendment, 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 182-83 (Nov. 2013), http://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/11/Cade-113-Colum.-L.-Rev.-Sidebar-180.pdf (summarizing how cooperative 
relationships, data-sharing technology, and state legislation have given state and local officers 
a significant role in selecting immigrants referred for removal hearings). 
 12. Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla:  State Interests and the Pursuit of Justice 
for Noncitizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1 (2012); Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis 
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turning attention to important but undertheorized players in 
immigration enforcement discretion:  the Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) attorneys who represent the government in 
immigration court.13 
 ICE’s trial attorneys are charged with “protecting the homeland” 
by diligently litigating removal cases against “undesirable” 
noncitizens, especially those who pose security risks, attempt to obtain 
immigration benefits through fraud, or have a criminal history.14  To do 
this work, they must establish grounds for removal, test the credibility 
of claims for asylum or other discretionary relief, and represent the 
government’s position on the necessity of a noncitizen’s detention.  In 
light of their enforcement-oriented responsibilities within an 
adversarial removal system, trial attorneys have sometimes been 
characterized as the government’s “gladiators” or the nation’s 
“gatekeepers.”15 
 Discretion permeates the work of attorneys, who are variably 
referred to as trial attorneys, ICE prosecutors, or assistant chief 
counsel.  They decide whether to pursue removal, which charges to 
levy, what trial tactics to employ, and whether to appeal adverse 
decisions in the hundreds of thousands of cases that make their way 
through our nation’s immigration courts every year.  These 
discretionary decisions matter for several reasons.  First, the 
categorical and categorically unforgiving nature of the current 
immigration code makes vast numbers of noncitizens removable on 
                                                                                                             
for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751 (2013); Stephen Lee, De 
Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 553 (2013). 
 13. A few recent or forthcoming articles touch on various aspects of the role of ICE’s 
trial attorneys in immigration enforcement.  See, e.g., Cade, supra note 11, at 185, 201-03 
(analyzing ICE prosecutors’ gate-keeping role in the immigration enforcement system where 
there have been upstream violations of constitutional rights); Erin B. Corcoran, Seek Justice, 
Not Just Deportation:  How To Improve Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 48 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (arguing that ICE attorneys have ethical duties to seek 
justice); Geoffrey Heeren, Shattering the One-Way Mirror:  Discovery in Immigration Court, 
79 BROOK. L. REV. 1569 (2014) (analyzing discovery asymmetries between ICE and 
noncitizen respondents); Nina Rabin, Victims or Criminals? Discretion, Sorting, and 
Bureaucratic Culture in the U.S. Immigration System, 23 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 195 
(2014) (arguing that DHS’s focus on criminal enforcement has frustrated the implementation 
of prosecutorial discretion priorities throughout the agency). 
 14. See discussion infra Part II.C.1. 
 15. See, e.g., Gregory Zhong Tian Chen, Elian or Alien?  The Contradictions of 
Protecting Undocumented Children Under the Special Immigrant Juvenile Statute, 27 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 597, 612 (2000) (“The role of the INS is that of a gatekeeper, not a 
disinterested party concerned with assessing the needs of children.”); Won Kidane, The 
Inquisitorial Advantage in Removal Proceedings, 45 AKRON L. REV. 647, 655 (2012) 
(describing ICE prosecutors as the government’s “gladiator-attorneys”). 
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the basis of immigration infractions or low-level criminal activity, 
while preventing immigration judges from even considering equitable 
relief. 16   Enforcement discretion thus injects flexibility into an 
otherwise rigid system, so that the complexity of an individual’s 
situation may be taken into account when necessary to avoid an overly 
harsh application of statutory law.  Second, ICE prosecutors are 
frontline gatekeepers of a system characterized by the pervasive use of 
detention, extreme backlogs, and weak process rights relative to the 
stakes.  These features elevate both the potential for erroneous results 
and the costs to taxpayers, noncitizens, and their families. 
 In light of the vast space for discretion in the removal system and 
the high stakes, do ICE attorneys have a duty to “seek justice”?  Some 
scholars and courts have suggested that, like other government 
attorneys, they do, but the contours of this duty in immigration 
proceedings have never been clearly or comprehensively defined.  One 
contribution of this Article, then, is to show that ICE prosecutors do 
have certain concrete responsibilities—expressed in statutory 
provisions, case law, and agency guidance—to seek legitimate 
objectives, take steps to ensure procedural justice, and exercise 
equitable discretion in appropriate cases.  Together these obligations 
comprise at least the minimal components of a prosecutorial duty to 
help the removal system achieve justice, rather than to pursue removal 
orders in every case and by any means necessary.17 
 While their dual obligations to effective enforcement and 
individualized justice will sometimes clearly align, the available 
evidence suggests that in many cases ICE attorneys are ineffectively 
identifying cases in which zealous enforcement should be tempered by 
discretion and the pursuit of justice.  Indeed, significant disparities in 
government attorneys’ approach to the exercise of discretion and 
litigation tactics mark the immigration system.  To begin with, the 
application of agency guidelines for equitable discretion in appropriate 
cases varies greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as indicated by 
data showing that just five immigration hearing locations account for 
more than half of all discretionary case closures nationwide in recent 
years.18  Other findings indicate that low priority or humanitarian cases 
are closed inconsistently, especially in cases involving pro se or 
detained noncitizens.19 
                                                 
 16. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 17. See discussion infra Part II.C.2. 
 18. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 19. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
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 ICE’s failure to adequately screen the merits of the cases it 
pursues is also evidenced by recent data on immigration court 
outcomes showing that despite statutory rigidity, immigration judges 
ultimately reject ICE’s request for removal orders at an astonishingly 
high rate:  almost 50% of the time.20   Finally, court observers, 
advocates, and federal judges have noted the fervent manner in which 
some ICE attorneys prosecute removal cases, for example by pursuing 
inaccurate or inflated grounds for removal; declining to negotiate, 
stipulate, or even communicate with noncitizens or their 
representatives before hearings; failing to turn over evidence bearing 
on removability; and sometimes opposing discretionary relief no 
matter how clear the merits or how strong the equities.21  These 
observations tend to be anecdotal, but they are pervasive enough to 
warrant further scrutiny of the role of ICE in immigration court. 
 Two forces in particular appear to motivate some trial attorneys to 
prioritize an aggressive one-size-fits-all approach over nuanced 
discretion and attention to individual justice.  First, ICE’s law-
enforcement, national-security mission—long a feature of the 
immigration agency’s culture, but one that became especially 
prominent following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
(9/11)—may have overridden its agents’ concomitant obligation to 
ensure the system does not deport those who have the right to stay or 
upon whom the law falls too harshly.22  This hypothesis has intuitive 
appeal and is supported by literature that posits the general tendency of 
“prosecutor bias” to subvert other agency objectives.23  Second, the vast 
population of potentially deportable noncitizens relative to current 
prosecutorial and adjudicative resources, in combination with a steady 
pipeline of immigration arrests by both federal agents and nonfederal 
“force multipliers,”24 has created overwhelming caseloads in many 
immigration courts. 25   Excessive workloads lead to prosecutorial 
inattention.26  The agency itself has acknowledged that its attorneys 
                                                 
 20. See discussion infra Parts III.B, V.E. 
 21. See discussion infra Parts III.B-D. 
 22. See Developments in the Law—Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1656 (2013); Rabin, supra note 13, at 209-35; discussion infra Parts 
II.C.1, IV.A. 
 23. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 24. Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier:  The Inherent Authority of 
Local Police To Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 181 (2005). 
 25. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 26. Cf. Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, Essay, The State (Never) Rests:  
How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261 
(2011) (making this observation about overworked criminal prosecutors). 
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have “extremely limited” time for preparation, sometimes averaging as 
little as twenty minutes per case.27 
 The upshot is that while the Executive Branch plainly expects its 
attorneys to help facilitate justice in removal proceedings, it has failed 
to provide them with structural mechanisms and incentives sufficient 
to consistently overcome institutionalized enforcement biases and 
intense workloads.  As a result, little constrains ICE attorneys from 
privileging their protector role over their minister-of-justice role, even 
at the expense of consistency, accuracy, fairness, and adherence to 
agency directives intended to avoid undue harshness and make the 
most of limited resources.  ICE’s enforcement culture and workload 
burdens are unlikely to change, at least in the near future.  So the 
question facing the Executive Branch is whether and how it can adopt 
realistic measures inducing its agents to exercise discretion more 
consistently and to litigate more fairly. 
 I argue that the government should look to the nation’s criminal 
systems, where comparable enforcement biases and workload 
pressures complicate prosecutors’ navigation of similar obligations to 
enforcement and justice.  As criminal law scholars have observed, the 
challenges presented by these competing responsibilities are very real, 
even for the most seasoned and conscientious prosecutors.28  Although 
they are not homogenous, the nation’s federal and state criminal 
systems make use of various pretrial procedural rules and design 
features that significantly increase the likelihood that cases will be 
screened in a meaningful way and that power asymmetries between the 
government and the defendant will be ameliorated.  In particular, this 
Article focuses on four features of criminal systems:  (1) disclosure 
obligations, (2) vertical prosecution, (3) responsibility and authority to 
screen and decline removal cases, and (4) prehearing conferences.  
These mechanisms, which are rooted primarily in statutory or 
administrative policy, rather than in constitutional commands, impose 
manageable costs relative to likely gains and could be implemented 
                                                 
 27. Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, ICE, to All 
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor Chief Counsel, AM. U. WASH. C.L. 1 (Oct. 24, 2005), 
http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/reference/additional-materials/immigration/enforcement- 
detention-and-criminal-justice/government-documents/22092975-ICE-Guidance-Memo-Prose 
cutorial-Discretion-William-J-Howard-10-24-05.pdf. 
 28. See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE:  THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR 15-18 (2007); Bruce A. Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their 
Disclosure Obligations:  Can Prosecutors’ Offices Learn from Their Lawyers’ Mistakes?, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2161 (2010). 
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through agency policy changes or rulemaking, without the need for 
congressional legislation. 
 The Article proceeds as follows.  Part II provides background on 
the current removal system, ICE prosecutors’ role within it, and the 
sources of their obligations as both protectors and ministers of justice.  
Part III shows that discretion is exercised inconsistently under the 
current system and that many trial attorneys litigate removal cases in 
ways that impede, rather than advance, the cause of justice.  Part IV 
outlines the most plausible explanations for this state of affairs:  a 
culture of enforcement stringency and the reality of a heavy workload, 
neither of which is likely to change.  Accordingly, I argue in Part IV.C 
that DHS should look to the criminal system, where similar forces that 
work against prosecutorial justice-seeking duties are counteracted by 
measures that improve prosecutorial accountability and reduce power 
imbalances.  Part V focuses on four mechanisms in particular that 
would work to increase ICE prosecutors’ attentiveness to all their 
duties.  The net result should be earlier screening, improved prehearing 
communication and information flow, and greater exercise of 
discretion in favor of noncitizens, thus nudging ICE attorneys to fulfill 
their obligation to help the immigration system achieve justice.  I 
address implementation concerns in Part V.E. 
II. ICE TRIAL ATTORNEYS’ ROLE IN IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT 
A. The Current Statutory Removal Scheme 
 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) makes noncitizens 
subject to detention and deportation on the basis of a wide range of 
immigration violations and minor crimes, providing for only narrow 
grounds of relief.  Many commentators, including myself, have written 
on the expansive and unforgiving nature of modern statutory grounds 
for removal.29  I briefly revisit the subject here only to provide context 
for unfamiliar readers and to underscore the importance of 
                                                 
 29. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1479-80, 1483 (2010) (discussing 
Congress’s elimination of section 212(c)’s other forms of discretionary relief for persons with 
criminal convictions); Cade, supra note 12, at 1752-63, 1775-90; Daniel Kanstroom, 
Criminalizing the Undocumented:  Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th “Pale of 
Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639, 651-52 (2004); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New 
Path of Immigration Law:  Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 469, 482-86 (2007); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 
Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 
1938-41 (2000). 
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prosecutorial discretion in (1) reducing the likelihood of erroneous 
detentions or deportations and (2) identifying cases where strict 
enforcement would lead to unjust results. 
 For much of the twentieth century, statutory deportation grounds 
were generally subject to limitations that prevented lawful-resident 
noncitizens from being deported on the basis of conduct that occurred 
long ago or after they had been lawfully admitted for a significant 
period of time.30  Additionally, those who were subject to deportation 
were usually afforded the opportunity to argue that their positive 
equities and connections in the United States outweighed the gravity of 
their infractions, even where convicted of serious criminal activity.31 
 In the 1990s, the United States Congress widely expanded the 
categories of deportable offenses while sharply constricting 
opportunities for discretionary relief from removal at both the federal 
and state levels.32  Many minor offenses now fall within the statute’s 
capacious list of “aggravated felonies,” which trigger mandatory 
detention, deportation, and a permanent bar on lawful return to the 
United States.33  For example, simple marijuana possession with a one-
year sentence and misdemeanor battery with a year of probation can 
qualify as aggravated felonies, as can convictions for selling ten 
dollars’ worth of marijuana, shoplifting fifteen dollars’ worth of baby 
clothes, or forging a check for less than twenty dollars.34  Noncitizens 
deportable on the aggravated felony ground are ineligible for most 
forms of adjudicative discretionary relief, regardless of the strength of 
their ties in the United States, the passage of time since their offense, 
or whether their offense was classified as an aggravated felony at the 
time of conviction.35 
                                                 
 30. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:  
PROCESS AND POLICY 671-73 (7th ed. 2012); Neuman, supra note 2, at 621-24. 
 31. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(c), 66 
Stat. 163, 187 (1952), repealed by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, -597. 
 32. See IIRIRA, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 
18, 22, 28, and 42  U.S.C.); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 22, 28, 
and 42 U.S.C.); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 and 29 U.S.C.). 
 33. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)-(U) (2012); see also id. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (“Any 
alien . . . who again seeks admission . . . at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an 
aggravated felony[] is inadmissible.”). 
 34. See Cade, supra note 12, at 1759. 
 35. Before 1996, immigration judges were authorized by section 212(c) of the INA to 
determine whether deportation was warranted in individual cases based on factors like the 
nature of the offense, the length of the noncitizen’s residence, the hardship to family members 
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 Crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT), another deportation 
category, also can include relatively minor offenses, even if the 
criminal punishment levied consists only of a fine or community 
service.36  For example, CIMTs include petty shoplifting,37 theft of 
service offenses like turnstile jumping, 38  misdemeanor indecent 
exposure, 39  and passing bad checks. 40   Although not explicitly 
prohibited from seeking discretionary relief from an immigration 
judge, permanent residents deportable under this provision are 
foreclosed from establishing the seven-year residency requirement to 
qualify for cancellation of removal due to a stop-time rule.41 
 Any controlled substance offense makes a lawfully present 
noncitizen deportable and subject to mandatory detention, with the 
narrow exception of a single conviction for simple possession of thirty 
grams or less of marijuana.42  Convictions classified as domestic 
violence crimes trigger another ground for deportation.43  Many states 
punish misdemeanor drug offenses only with small fines,44 but the 
leniency of punishment is not a relevant factor in triggering the 
controlled substance or domestic violence grounds of removal, even if 
it means the state was not constitutionally required to afford the 
defendant a right to counsel or trial by jury.45  Indeed, even where 
                                                                                                             
that would be caused by the noncitizen’s deportation, evidence of rehabilitation, and so forth.  
INA § 212(c) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182). 
 36. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (CIMT within five years of admission).  Two CIMTs 
make a noncitizen deportable regardless of whether either was committed within five years of 
admission.  Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
 37. Da Rosa Silva v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1011 
(E.D. Pa. 2003) (holding that shoplifting is a crime constituting moral turpitude). 
 38. See Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 39. See In re Cortes Medina, 26 I. & N. Dec. 79 (B.I.A. 2013) (holding that a 
violation of section 314(1) of the California Penal Code, which includes misdemeanor-level 
indecent exposure, is a CIMT). 
 40. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. § 2C:21-2.4 (2014) (classifying the offense of passing bad 
checks as a “disorderly persons offense”); Baer v. Norene, 79 F.2d 340, 341 (9th Cir. 1935) 
(describing check forgery as an offense that involves moral turpitude); Susan L. Pilcher, 
Justice Without a Blindfold:  Criminal Proceedings and the Alien Defendant, 50 ARK. L. REV. 
269, 312-13 (1997) (explaining that passing bad checks is a crime that may involve moral 
turpitude under deportation law). 
 41. Morawetz, supra note 29, at 1941 (observing that the commission of a crime 
stops the accumulation of seven years’ residence for purposes of qualifying for cancellation 
of removal). 
 42. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012). 
 43. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). 
 44. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357(b) (West 2007); MINN. STAT. 
§ 152.027(4) (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.336 (2013); N.J. STAT. § 2C:35-10(a)(4) (2014); 
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 221.05, .10 (McKinney 2008). 
 45. In re Cuellar-Gomez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 850, 851-55 (B.I.A. 2012) (holding that a 
municipal marijuana violation where the defendant was not afforded a right to counsel or 
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noncitizens charged with drug, domestic violence, or other offenses 
enter a diversionary program, in which criminal adjudication and 
sentencing is deferred and dismissed upon successful completion of 
the program’s requirements, federal law treats the result as a conviction 
for immigration purposes if the noncitizen had to plead guilty to 
qualify for the program.46  An emerging but robust body of work 
suggests that misdemeanor convictions are often unreliable indicators 
of guilt, due to the exploding number of misdemeanor prosecutions 
and weak process rights in many lower-level courts throughout the 
United States, despite the significant collateral consequences that can 
follow such convictions.47  Yet most convictions leading to immigration 
consequences are in fact misdemeanors.48 
                                                                                                             
advised of potential immigration consequences counts as a conviction for immigration 
purposes); Cade, supra note 12, at 1778 (discussing states that do not provide counsel to 
misdemeanor defendants where incarceration is not at issue). 
 46. See Jason A. Cade, Deporting the Pardoned, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 355, 380-81, 
394-96 (2012) (discussing the tension between the operation of federal immigration law and 
states’ goals in diversionary or deferred adjudication programs); The Immigration 
Consequences of Deferred Adjudication Programs in New York City, N.Y.C. BAR 1-4 (June 
2007), http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Immigration.pdf.  Many states require a plea of 
guilty before a defendant can enter a diversionary program.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 600.1068 (2014) (declaring that the drug treatment diversionary program requires a guilty 
plea); id. § 769.4a (declaring that the domestic violence diversionary program requires a 
person be found guilty or plead guilty); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 216.05 (McKinney 2007) 
(declaring that a drug treatment diversionary program requires a guilty plea); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
43A, § 3-452 (2013) (same). 
 47. John D. King, Procedural Justice, Collateral Consequences, and the Adjudication 
of Misdemeanors in the United States, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
20 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012); Cade, supra note 12, at 1753-56; Alexandra 
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2012); Jenny Roberts, Why Misde-
meanors Matter:  Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 277 (2011); see also Robert C. Boruchowitz et al., Minor Crimes, Massive Waste:  
The Terrible Toll of America’s Broken Misdemeanor Courts, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW. 11 
(Apr. 2009), http://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=20808 
(explaining that the large volume of misdemeanor cases has led to innocent defendants being 
forced to plead guilty); No Day in Court:  Marijuana Possession Cases and the Failure of the 
Bronx Criminal Courts, BRONX DEFENDERS (May 2013), http://www.bronxdefenders.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/No-Day-in-Court-A-Report-by-The-Bronx-Defenders-May-2013.pdf 
(explaining how insufficient procedural safeguards in the Bronx misdemeanor courts have left 
many defendants unable to effectively contest the charges leveled against them); The 
Spangenberg Grp., Status of Indigent Defense in New York:  A Study for Chief Judge Kaye’s 
Commission on the Future of Indigent Defense Services, N.Y. CTS. 143 (June 16, 2006), http:// 
www.nycourts.gov/ip/indigentdefense-commission/SpangenbergGroupReport.pdf (arguing that 
a lack of funding has left New York’s indigent defense system unable to provide effective 
representation). 
 48. Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, 
Records Show, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/more-
deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows.html. 
 
 
 
 
2014] JUSTICE IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 13 
 
 As for noncitizens who are not lawful permanent residents, the 
statute prescribes removal for those who entered without inspection,49 
as well as for a wide variety of immigration violations committed after 
lawful admission.50  There is no statutory exception for noncitizens 
who entered the United States as young children and never left.  
Eligibility for consideration of discretionary relief from removal is 
very tightly constrained:  the noncitizen must show ten years of 
continuous physical presence in the United States, ten years of “good 
moral character,” and that removal would result in “exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship” to their spouse, parent, or child—as long 
as the qualifying family member is a citizen or lawful permanent 
resident.51  Commission of a removable offense, or service of the 
removal proceedings charging document, stops the accrual of time for 
purposes of establishing continuous residence.52  Additionally, only 
4,000 persons, whether lawful permanent residents or not, may be 
granted cancellation of removal per year.53 
 In sum, immigration violations and minor convictions may 
trigger removal for noncitizens despite their lawful presence and 
without respect to their equities.  Outside of the strict criteria described 
above, the statute does not limit removal based on consideration of the 
length of residence, contributions to society, or the number and 
strength of relationships with U.S. citizen family members.  This 
sweeping, categorical, and unforgiving approach thus elevates the role 
of enforcement discretion, which must compensate for the statute’s 
lack of nuance. 
                                                 
 49. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012) (“[A noncitizen is inadmissible if] present 
in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at 
any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General . . . .”). 
 50. See, e.g., id. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (stating that a noncitizen is deportable if they were 
inadmissible for any reason when they entered the United States); id. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (stating 
that a noncitizen is deportable for overstaying an authorized period of admission); id. 
§ 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (stating that a noncitizen is deportable for violating the conditions of 
admission); id. § 1227(a)(3) (stating that a noncitizen is deportable for failing to register or 
provide notice of a change of address); id. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (stating that noncitizens in the 
United States who previously accrued at least six months of unlawful presence and then 
departed the United States are inadmissible for various statutory periods and are therefore 
removable). 
 51. See id. § 1229b(b).  The exceptional and extremely unusual hardship threshold is 
applied rigorously.  See In re Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 2002). 
 52. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). 
 53. See id. § 1229b(e). 
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B. Overview of Removal Proceedings 
 Removal proceedings are administrative adjudication hearings 
intended to determine a noncitizen’s eligibility to remain in the United 
States.  Immigration judges adjudicate removal proceedings and 
related matters under the auspices of the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (EOIR), a subagency within the Department of 
Justice (DOJ).54  Immigration judges are “career attorneys” employed 
for indefinite terms.55  Immigration court is adversarial:  trial attorneys 
prosecute on behalf of the government while the noncitizen appears 
pro se unless they can retain an attorney.  There is no right to appointed 
counsel in immigration court, and just under half of all noncitizens 
proceed without representation.56 
 Removal proceedings are commenced through a charging 
document called a Notice To Appear (NTA).57  The NTA must specify 
“[t]he charges against the alien and the statutory provisions alleged to 
have been violated.”58  The immigration judge acquires jurisdiction 
once an NTA has been issued to a respondent and filed in the 
immigration court.59   Although the trial attorneys have exclusive 
authority to conduct removal prosecutions, a variety of ICE officers, as 
well as officers from other agencies within DHS, are also authorized to 
initiate such proceedings.60  In fact, the trial attorneys themselves often 
                                                 
 54. EOIR at a Glance, DOJ (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2010/ 
EOIRataGlance09092010.htm. 
 55. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4); Lenni B. Benson & Russell R. Wheeler, Enhancing 
Quality and Timeliness in Immigration Removal Adjudication, ADMIN. CONF. U.S. 7 (June 7, 
2012), http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Enhancing-Quality-and-Timeliness-
in-Immigration-Removal-Adjudication-Final-June-72012.pdf; Judicial Oversight v. Judicial 
Independence, TRAC (2008), http://www.trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/194/include/side_ 
4.html. 
 56. FY 2013 Statistics Yearbook, DOJ F1 (Apr. 2014), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ 
statspub/fy13syb.pdf (reporting that in FY2012, 50% of respondents were represented in 
removal proceedings).  Noncitizens do enjoy the “privilege of being represented, at no 
expense to the Government, by counsel of the [noncitizen’s] choosing who is authorized to 
practice in such proceedings.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4).  Such representation frequently does 
not involve a lawyer, as permitted “counsel” in immigration matters includes law students, 
EOIR-accredited nonlawyer representatives, and, in certain circumstances, other “reputable 
individuals.”  8 C.F.R. §§ 1292.1-.2 (2014). 
 57. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO 
PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION 
OF REMOVAL CASES 1-5, 1-10 to -11 (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/migrated/Immigration/PublicDocuments/aba_complete_full_report.authcheckdam.p
df.  The NTA is Form I-862.  Id. at 1-18 n.98. 
 58. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(D).  NTAs must also contain various notices to the 
respondent.  See id. § 1229(a). 
 59. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14. 
 60. See id. § 239.1 (listing officers authorized to issue NTAs). 
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do not make the decision to file a charging document with the 
immigration court and instead are typically assigned to cases only later 
in the process.61 
 At a “master calendar” hearing (similar to a criminal arraign-
ment), a group of respondents appears before an immigration judge.62  
Each case is called individually before the judge, who must determine 
whether the noncitizen understands the charges in the NTA and notify 
the noncitizen of the right to seek representation at no expense to the 
government.63  Immigration judges also use master calendar hearings 
to take noncitizens’ pleas in response to the allegations of removability 
set forth in the NTA.64   Often noncitizens simply admit to the 
government’s charges, and the judge makes a finding of removability.65 
 If the noncitizen contests removability by denying some or all of 
the allegations in the NTA, the government has the burden of 
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is in fact 
not a citizen,66 which shifts the burden to the respondent to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that he or she is nevertheless lawfully 
present in the United States.67  If the noncitizen can establish lawful 
presence, the burden shifts back to ICE to prove removability, again by 
clear and convincing evidence.  To meet their burden, trial attorneys 
generally rely on documents concerning the noncitizen that are 
maintained in the government’s “A-file.”68  In cases involving lawful 
                                                 
 61. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 57, at 1-11 to -13 (providing statistics for 
FY2004 to FY2009 on agencies and units initiating removal proceedings); see discussion 
infra Part V.B. 
 62. See Immigration Judge Benchbook:  Introduction to the Master Calendar, DOJ, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/tools/Purpose_and_History_of_MC.pdf (last updated 
Aug. 2014). 
 63. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a); Immigration Judge Benchbook:  Introduction to the 
Master Calendar, supra note 62. 
 64. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c).  Trial attorneys can lodge additional grounds of 
removability at later stages of proceedings.  Id. § 1240.10(e). 
 65. EOIR at a Glance, supra note 54 (“In most removal proceedings, individuals 
admit that they are removable, but then apply for one or more forms of relief.”). 
 66. In re Corona-Palomera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 661 F.2d 814, 817 
(9th Cir. 1981).  Often this burden is met through the noncitizen’s statements at the time of 
apprehension, or other alienage information contained in the Form I-213 that ICE submits at 
the master calendar hearing.  See In re Ponce-Hernandez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 784, 785 (B.I.A. 
1999) (holding that Form I-213 is “inherently trustworthy” to establish alienage unless there 
is evidence that it contains incorrect information or “was obtained by coercion or duress”). 
 67. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(B) (2012); id. § 1361. 
 68. See Privacy Act; Alien File (A-File) and Central Index System (CIS) Systems of 
Records, 72 Fed. Reg. 1755, 1757 (Jan. 16, 2007) (“The hardcopy paper A-File (which, prior 
to 1940, was called Citizenship File (C-File[)] contains all the individual’s official record 
material such as:  naturalization certificates; various forms and attachments (e.g., 
photographs); applications and petitions for benefits under the immigration and nationality 
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permanent residents who have been convicted of a crime, for example, 
the prosecutor might introduce a record of conviction from criminal 
court and argue that it falls within one of the INA’s criminal grounds 
for removal. 69   The noncitizen (or their representative) has the 
opportunity to contest the government’s evidence, although discovery 
is quite limited in practice.70  Proceedings establishing removability can 
take place across one or more master calendar or individual hearings, 
depending on the complexity of the issues. 
 After removability is established through the noncitizen’s 
admissions or the government’s satisfaction of its evidentiary burden, 
the immigration judge either enters an order of deportation, or, if the 
noncitizen appears eligible for some form of discretionary relief, 
schedules the matter for a merits hearing.71  At the merits hearing, ICE 
attorneys can challenge the noncitizen’s asserted grounds for a right to 
remain, which typically involve asylum,72 cancellation of removal,73 or 
adjustment of status.74 
 At each stage of the removal proceeding, the trial attorney wields 
discretion.  Foremost, the attorney has discretion with respect to 
whether even to pursue removal against a particular noncitizen.75  In 
regional offices where trial attorneys have the opportunity to screen 
NTAs before they are filed, such discretion comes into play before 
                                                                                                             
laws; reports of investigations; statements; reports; correspondence; and memoranda on each 
individual for whom DHS has created a record under the Immigration and Nationality Act.”). 
 69. Alternatively, if the case involves a noncitizen alleged to have overstayed a visa, 
the prosecutor would submit government-maintained documents showing issuance of a visa 
to the noncitizen with an expiration date that has now passed.  Or, if the matter involves a 
noncitizen alleged to have entered the country without being lawfully admitted, the 
prosecutor might establish removability by submitting a foreign birth certificate with details 
matching those of the noncitizen. 
 70. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 71. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c) (2014); see Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring 
Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1641-42 (2010). 
 72. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (making asylum available to persons who can establish that they 
face persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion, and who meet other statutory requirements). 
 73. Id. § 1229b(a) (establishing discretionary cancellation of removal for lawful 
permanent residents who have lawfully resided in the United States for at least seven years); 
id. § 1229b(b)(1) (establishing that discretionary cancellation of removal for persons who are 
not lawful permanent residents requires that they have ten years of physical presence and that 
they make a showing of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to qualifying family 
members).  
 74. See id. § 1255(a) (indicating that, subject to exceptions, a noncitizen can adjust 
their status to that of a lawful permanent resident without processing abroad through the 
consulate if they have an immigrant visa immediately available at the time the application is 
filed). 
 75. See Cade, supra note 11. 
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proceedings begin.76  They have the authority to cancel NTAs for legal 
insufficiency or to decline to file the charging document with court, in 
the exercise of discretion.77  When other immigration officers from 
ICE or the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issue 
NTAs to noncitizens and initiate proceedings without trial attorney 
review, as is common in many jurisdictions, trial attorneys can still 
move to close or terminate proceedings administratively.78  They can 
also consent to relief or decline to appeal an immigration judge’s 
decision in favor of the noncitizen.79  Additionally, ICE prosecutors 
have discretion over how to pursue the removal of a noncitizen.  For 
example, they decide what evidence and tactics to use in establishing 
removability or contesting eligibility for relief.  The authority for 
immigration prosecutorial discretion is both explicitly recognized in 
top-level DHS policy memoranda 80  and inherent in a massive 
enforcement scheme where resource constraints allow officials to 
process only a tiny fraction of the total number of persons eligible for 
sanctions.81 
                                                 
 76. See, e.g., Interview with ICE Trial Attorney in Small Midwestern Office (Dec. 
20, 2013) (stating that attorneys in her office typically review NTAs before filing them with 
the court) (on file with author). 
 77. 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(a) (2014) (providing authority to cancel NTAs for legal 
insufficiency); see also In re G-N-C-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 281, 284 (B.I.A. 1998) (“We recognize 
that the decision to institute deportation proceedings involves the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion and is not a decision which the Immigration Judge or the Board may review.  
Likewise, a Service officer authorized to issue a Notice to Appear has complete power to 
cancel such notice prior to jurisdiction vesting with the Immigration Judge.” (citations 
omitted)); Benson & Wheeler, supra note 55, at 38 (“ICE officials told us that ICE trial 
attorneys have the authority to reject insufficient NTAs . . . .”); Memorandum from William J. 
Howard to All Office of the Principal Legal Advisor Chief Counsel, supra note 27, at 5 
(encouraging ICE prosecutors not to file NTAs until decisions are made on certain visa 
applications). 
 78. 8 C.F.R. §§ 239.2(c), 1239.2(c); see also In re G-N-C-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 281 
(“Once the charging document is filed with the Immigration Court and jurisdiction is vested 
in the Immigration Judge, the Service may move to terminate the proceedings, but it may not 
simply cancel the charging document.”). 
 79. According to one trial attorney I spoke with, in her office supervisory approval is 
not needed to decline to appeal an immigration judge’s decision.  Interview with ICE Trial 
Attorney in Large Urban Office (Sept. 10, 2013) (on file with author). 
 80. See discussion infra Part II.C.2; Memorandum from John Morton to All ICE 
Employees, supra note 3 (setting forth guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
in light of the fact that the immigration system can process only about 400,000 of the 
estimated 11 million undocumented persons in the United States per year). 
 81. MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY:  DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
IN PUBLIC SERVICES 13-16 (2010) (discussing the inherent discretion in large enforcement 
bureaucracies); KATE M. MANUEL & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42924, 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:  LEGAL ISSUES 8-13 (2013) 
(discussing authority for executive prosecutorial discretion in immigration law). 
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C. Competing Objectives and Expectations 
 There is little doubt that ICE prosecutors, like all immigration 
officers, have significant responsibilities.  As Mariano-Florentino 
Cuéllar has observed, “A country’s approach to immigration is a major 
feature of its national architecture, defining the scope of a national 
community as well as functional issues of economic consequences and 
security-related concerns.”82  Trial attorneys thus administer laws that 
bear on the nation’s public safety and security.  At the same time, trial 
attorneys are expected to prosecute suspected immigration violators in 
ways that make the removal adjudication system as just and accurate as 
possible, especially in light of the categorical nature of the modern 
statutory scheme.  This Subpart describes these often competing 
objectives and expectations. 
1. Enforcers and Protectors 
 In response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Congress in 2003 
created DHS, a cabinet-level agency, through the merger of twenty-two 
agencies and programs with responsibility for various national security 
functions. 83   As part of this merger, Congress dissolved the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and distributed its 
enforcement and service functions among three subagencies:  United 
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), CBP, and ICE.  
Whereas the INS was responsible for both deporting immigration 
violators and implementing immigration laws’ humanitarian and 
benefits components, under DHS these functions were segregated, 
with ICE and CBP sharing enforcement responsibilities and USCIS 
alone administering the benefits scheme.84  From its inception, then, 
ICE has viewed its mission as safeguarding the nation’s security 
                                                 
 82. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Political Economies of Immigration Law, 2 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 1, 26 (2012); see also id. at 33 (“Finally, immigration, at its core, is a means 
through which we delimit national communities in a world where laws and societies are 
defined—at least in principle—by the scope of the nation-state.”); Peter H. Schuck, 
Importing Diversity:  Immigration, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK (Feb. 16, 2002), http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=305801 (explaining how U.S. immigration laws 
historically have both encouraged and limited diversity in this country). 
 83. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. 
 84. Rabin, supra note 13, at 216-17; Difference Between U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (Sept. 4, 2014), 
10:37 AM), https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/1040/~/difference-between-u.s.-customs-
and-border-protection-(cbp),-u.s.-citizenship. 
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through the enforcement of immigration laws, and its relationship with 
noncitizens has been one of opposition.85 
 To be sure, the enforcement objective took center stage within the 
immigration agency long before 9/11.  Indeed, “From its founding in 
1891 until the early 1920s, the [Immigration] Service’s functions were 
few and they were overwhelmingly enforcement-oriented . . . .”86  In 
the early years of immigration policy, the INS primarily was 
responsible for the exclusion of “certain categories of undesirables.”87  
Over time, Congress added more and more grounds for excluding or 
deporting noncitizens, especially those with criminal histories. 88  
Scholars have widely noted how legislation in the mid-1990s 
galvanized associations between immigrants and criminality by 
expanding grounds for deportation on the basis of convictions, 
narrowing opportunities for relief from removal, and mandating 
detention for most noncitizens with criminal histories.89 
 This historical focus on criminality and exclusion only intensified 
with the dissolution of the INS and creation of ICE.  The agency saw 
itself as having been forged “from the crucible of the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001,”90 and “[e]stablished to combat the criminal 
and national security threats emergent in a post 9/11 environment.”91  
Its self-described “vision statement” was “[t]o be the nation’s 
                                                 
 85. Rabin, supra note 13, at 216-26. 
 86. Cornelius D. Scully, Reorganizing the Administration of the Immigration Laws:  
Recommendations and Historical Context, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 937, 939 (1998). 
 87. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 70-106 O, HISTORY OF THE IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 1 (1980). 
 88. DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION:  OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
131-246 (2007). 
 89. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Commentary, Unsecured Borders:  Immigration 
Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1843-48 (2007) 
(arguing that the expansion of criminal grounds for removal in 1996, along with increased 
criminal prosecution for immigration offenses, “have shored up the popular construction of 
immigrants as criminal threats”); Morawetz, supra note 29 (explaining the impact of 
immigration legislation in 1996 on noncitizens with criminal history); Juliet Stumpf, The 
Crimmigration Crisis:  Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 419 
(2006) (“When noncitizens are classified as criminals, expulsion presents itself as the natural 
solution.  The individual’s stake in the U.S. community, such as family ties, employment, 
contribution to the community, and whether the noncitizen has spent a majority of his lifetime 
in the United States, becomes secondary to the perceived need to protect the community.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 90. See, e.g., ICE, ICE:  Fiscal Year 2006 Annual Report, CHESAPEAKE DIGITAL 
PRESERVATION GROUP 2, http://cdm16064.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p266901 
coll4/id/2168 (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). 
 91. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Mission, U.S. DIPLOMATIC 
MISSION TO BRAZ., http://brazil.usembassy.gov/sections-offices/immigration-and-customs-
enforcement.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). 
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preeminent law enforcement agency, dedicated to detecting 
vulnerabilities and preventing violations that threaten national 
security.”92 
 Time and again ICE has emphasized its security mission.  In 
press releases, budget reports, and public addresses, the agency has 
described its role “to protect America and uphold public safety by 
targeting the people, money and materials that support terrorist and 
criminal activities.”93  Explaining the Secure Communities program in 
2011, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano stated that DHS “established, 
as a top priority, the identification and removal of public safety and 
national security threats.”94  ICE’s current website states that its mission 
is to “promote homeland security and public safety through the 
criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing border 
control, customs, trade and immigration.”95 
 ICE trial attorneys are thus tasked with “protect[ing] the 
homeland by diligently litigating cases.”96  They work within an agency 
culture with deeply rooted emphasis on enforcement that intensified 
following Congress’s bureaucratic restructuring in response to the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11.  It is not surprising, then, to hear one chief 
counsel in charge of a regional ICE office describe himself as a “child 
of 9/11” and explain that the terrorist attack was his motivation to 
become an immigration prosecutor.97 
2. Ministers of Justice 
 Although their role as guardians of the nation’s safety through 
diligent enforcement of immigration law presents a crucial duty, ICE 
                                                 
 92. Id.; see also ICE Unveils “Most Wanted” Criminal Aliens List, ILW.COM (May 
14, 2003), http://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/News/2003,0516-alienlist.shtm (“ICE is 
committed to ensuring the safety of the American public. Reducing the number of dangerous 
criminal aliens hiding in this country is a crucial part of that mission.”). 
 93. See, e.g., ICE, supra note 90, at 2; Immigration Enforcement:  The Rhetoric, the 
Reality, TRAC (May 28, 2007), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/178/ (reporting, for 
example, former Assistant Secretary of ICE Julie Myers’ address to a conference of 
immigration lawyers in 2007). 
 94. Secretary Napolitano’s Remarks on Smart Effective Border Security and 
Immigration Enforcement, DHS (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/10/05/ 
secretary-napolitanos-remarks-smart-effective-border-security-and-immigration. 
 95. Overview, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (expand the “What We Do” 
heading) (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). 
 96. Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA), ICE, http://www.ice.gov/about/ 
offices/leadership/opla/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). 
 97. Betsy Cavendish & Steven Schulman, Reimagining the Immigration Court 
Assembly Line, APPLESEED 40 (2012), http://www.appleseednetwork.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/03/Reimagining-the-Immigration-Court-Assembly-Line.pdf. 
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attorneys have additional responsibilities imposed by Congress, courts, 
and key agency overseers.  Put broadly, trial attorneys are not afforded 
the convenience of merely seeking to win every removal case that 
comes before them in immigration court.  Instead, they are also “duty-
bound to ‘cut square corners’ and seek justice rather than victory.”98  
This obligation is similar to that of prosecutors in the criminal system, 
who may not single-mindedly seek convictions, but must be “ministers 
of justice.”99 
 While private practitioners are permitted or even encouraged to 
advance their private client’s (lawful) objectives through any means 
short of illegal or ethically proscribed conduct,100 government attorneys 
are generally expected to be constrained from no-holds-barred 
advocacy, given their special obligations as both members of and 
representatives for the government. 101   Because they represent a 
“sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling 
as its obligation to govern at all,”102 government attorneys are said to 
have a professional responsibility to seek justice.103 
 The concept that government attorneys have a duty to seek justice 
in the context of removal proceedings is not merely an abstract ideal.  
                                                 
 98. Kang v. Attorney Gen., 611 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Reid v. INS, 
949 F.2d 287, 288 (9th Cir. 1991) (commending the INS’s attorney for admitting error in light 
of the principle that “[c]ounsel for the government has an interest only in the law being 
observed, not in victory or defeat in any particular litigation”); In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 
722, 727 (B.I.A. 1997) (“[I]mmigration enforcement obligations do not consist only of 
initiating and conducting prompt proceedings that lead to removals at any cost. Rather, as has 
been said, the government wins when justice is done.”). 
 99. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2013) (“A prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”); see Bruce A. 
Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 612-18 (1999). 
 100. See Steven K. Berenson, The Duty Defined:  Specific Obligations that Follow 
from Civil Government Lawyers’ General Duty To Serve the Public Interest, 42 BRANDEIS 
L.J. 13, 18 (2003). 
 101. See Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers “Seek Justice” in Civil 
Litigation?, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 235, 238, 265-67 (2000). 
 102. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 103. See MANUEL & GARVEY, supra note 81, at 8-9 (summarizing the judicial 
sentiment that enforcement discretion is an executive function essential to the “proper 
administration of justice”); Berenson, supra note 100, at 17-31; Green, supra note 101, at 
237-38, 256-79; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1980) (“A 
government lawyer who has discretionary power relative to litigation should refrain from 
instituting or continuing litigation that is obviously unfair.  A government lawyer not having 
such discretionary power who believes there is lack of merit in a controversy submitted to 
him should so advise his superiors and recommend the avoidance of unfair litigation.  A 
government lawyer in a civil action or administrative proceeding has the responsibility to seek 
justice and to develop a full and fair record, and he should not use his position or the 
economic power of the government to harass parties or to bring about unjust settlements or 
results.”). 
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Rather, a variety of legal sources—statutory provisions, training 
materials, agency memoranda, and case law—charge trial attorneys 
with this responsibility.  Moreover, their responsibility to help the 
system achieve justice is multifaceted, thus confirming its breadth and 
depth.  This Subpart sketches the origins and contours of three 
minimal components of the minister-of-justice duty:  legitimate 
objectives, procedural fairness, and equitable discretion. 
 First, trial attorneys may pursue only lawful objectives through 
immigration enforcement actions.  Most obviously, ICE may not seek 
to remove U.S. citizens, because statutory deportation laws apply only 
to “aliens.”104  In the wake of erroneous removals of citizens,105 ICE 
officials have emphasized to Congress and the public that its agents 
are trained on the responsibility to avoid such mistakes.106  Such 
guidance includes an agency memorandum instructing ICE to “fully 
investigate the merits of any claim to citizenship made by an individual 
who is subject to a Notice to Appear.”107  Appropriate measures may 
include searching vital records and interviewing family members.108 
 Even where citizenship is not at issue, trial attorneys have no 
legitimate interest in “deporting those who are not deportable, or in 
                                                 
 104. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2012); see also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) 
(considering a derivative citizenship claim that would defeat the government’s attempt to 
deport a person with a criminal record). 
 105. See, e.g., Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and 
Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606 (2011) (discussing the 
erroneous detention and deportation of U.S. citizens); William Finnegan, The Deportation 
Machine, NEW YORKER (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/04/29/ 
the-deportation-machine (same); Ice Detainers Placed on U.S. Citizens and Legal Permanent 
Residents, TRAC (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/311 (showing 
that data provided by ICE indicated that 834 ICE detainers were issued against U.S. citizens 
between FY2008 and FY2012); Ted Robbins, In the Rush To Deport, Expelling U.S. Citizens, 
NPR (Oct. 24, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/10/24/141500145/in-the-rush-to-
deport-expelling-u-s-citizens (discussing the erroneous detention and deportation of U.S. 
citizens); see also DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH:  DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW 
AMERICAN DIASPORA 14-15, 99-102 (2012). 
 106. See, e.g., Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention and Removal Procedures:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. & Int’l 
Law, 110th Cong. 110-80 (2008) (statement of Gary E. Mead, Deputy Director, Office of 
Detention & Removal Operations, ICE, DHS). 
 107. Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, ICE, to Field Office Directors, 
Special Agents in Charge, Chief Counsels, ICE, ICE 2-3 (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/reporting-investigating-us-citizen-claims.pdf; see also 
SAN ANTONIO OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, ICE, OFFICE MANUAL 119-23 (Jan. 8, 2014) 
(providing trial attorneys with detailed guidance on the duty to investigate claims to U.S. 
citizenship) (on file with author). 
 108. Memorandum from John Morton to Field Office Directors, supra note 107. 
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barring from discretionary relief those who are eligible.”109  ICE’s 
policy for facilitating the return of noncitizens who prevail on appeal 
after being deported reflects the agency’s commitment to seeking only 
legitimate removals.110  According to Professor David Martin, former 
general counsel to both DHS and the INS, trial attorneys are trained to 
probe a respondent’s claims but are expected to support adjudicatory 
relief from removal if persuaded of the credibility and legal merit of 
the noncitizen’s account. 111   Likewise, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) has emphasized trial attorneys’ shared obligation to 
ensure that the United States in fact offers refuge to persons seeking 
asylum in immigration court when warranted under applicable law.112 
 Second, ICE prosecutors must promote procedural justice.  An 
ICE attorney is “the representative of a government dedicated to 
fairness and equal justice to all and, in this respect, he owes a heavy 
obligation to [his adversary].”113  Training materials for trial attorneys 
have long established that respondents should be aided in obtaining 
any procedural rights or benefits required by the controlling statutes, 
regulations, and court decisions, or by the requirements of fairness.114  
The immigration statute provides that a noncitizen charged with 
overcoming potential grounds of inadmissibility “shall have access to 
the alien’s visa or other entry document, if any, and any other records 
and documents, not considered by the Attorney General to be 
confidential, pertaining to the alien’s admission or presence in the 
                                                 
 109. Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Remedies for the Wrongly Deported:  Territoriality, 
Finality, and the Significance of Departure, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 191-92 (2010). 
 110. See John Morton, 11061.1:  Facilitating the Return to the United States of Certain 
Lawfully Removed Aliens, ICE (Feb. 24, 2012), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro_policy_ 
memos/11061.1_current_policy_facilitating_return.pdf. 
 111. E-mail from David A. Martin, Professor of Law, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, to 
Immigration Law Professors List (Sept. 7, 2013, 1:47 PM) (on file with author) (“As INS 
General Counsel, I often emphasized in such settings that attorneys were expected to ask 
serious questions in immigration court to probe a person’s narrative and also to clarify details, 
but at the end of that process, if persuaded of the account (and its legal merit), the attorney 
should indicate that the government supports or would have no objection to the grant of relief 
(asylum, cancellation, etc.).”). 
 112. In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 723, 727 (B.I.A. 1997) (“Because this Board, 
the Immigration Judges, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service are all bound to 
uphold this law, we all bear the responsibility of ensuring that refugee protection is provided 
where such protection is warranted by the circumstances of an asylum applicant’s claim.”). 
 113. Kang v. Attorney Gen., 611 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Handford v. 
United States, 249 F.2d 295, 296 (5th Cir. 1958)). 
 114. See, e.g., In re S-M-J, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 737 (referring to agency training 
material); SAN ANTONIO OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, ICE, supra note 107, at 129-32 
(instructing that trial attorneys must turn over evidence in their possession bearing on the 
noncitizen’s mental incompetence to ensure that the immigration judge can evaluate whether 
counsel should be appointed as required by the BIA). 
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United States.”115  A related provision requires that noncitizens in 
immigration court be given “a reasonable opportunity to examine the 
evidence” against them.116  While the full extent of the government’s 
disclosure requirements under these provisions is contested, at least 
one federal court of appeals has held that they create a “mandatory 
access” rule, generally requiring the government to turn over any 
helpful records possessed in the noncitizen’s A-file.117  In the context of 
asylum adjudications, the BIA has similarly indicated its expectation 
that government attorneys, who often have significantly greater 
resources and access to information, will independently introduce 
evidence bearing on the merits of noncitizens’ claims.118 
 Finally, ICE attorneys’ role as ministers of justice requires them 
to exercise equitable discretion.119  As described by William Howard, 
former ICE Principal Legal Advisor, in a memorandum to agency 
attorneys: 
Prosecutorial discretion is a very significant tool that sometimes 
enables you to deal with the difficult, complex and contradictory 
provisions of the immigration laws and cases involving human 
suffering and hardship. . . .  Our reasoned determination in making 
prosecutorial discretion decisions can be a significant benefit to the 
efficiency and fairness of the removal process.120 
 In the context of immigration court, prosecutorial discretion most 
often refers to the agency’s authority to decide not to seek a removal 
order against someone suspected to be present in violation of 
immigration laws.121  Although the agency has worked under internal 
                                                 
 115. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2) (2012). 
 116. Id. § 1229a(b)(4)(B). 
 117. Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 374-75 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We construe the ‘shall 
have access’ statute to provide a rule for removal proceedings . . . .  We are unable to imagine 
a good reason for not producing the A-file routinely without a request, but another case may 
address that issue when facts call for it.”).  As discussed further below, many ICE attorneys 
have resisted the holding in Dent, and other circuits have yet to reach the issue.  See 
discussion infra Part III.C. 
 118. In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 726-27 (B.I.A. 1997); see also id. at 737-39 
(Rosenberg, Board Member, concurring) (noting frequent information asymmetries between 
asylum applicants and the government and concluding that “as the majority explains, the 
Service should present any evidence it has, supporting or contradicting the applicant’s asylum 
claim”). 
 119. See MANUEL & GARVEY, supra note 81, at 8-9 (summarizing the judicial 
sentiment that enforcement discretion is an executive function essential to the “proper 
administration of justice”). 
 120. Memorandum from William J. Howard to All Office of the Principal Legal 
Advisor Chief Counsel, supra note 27, at 8. 
 121. See, e.g., Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, INS, to Regional 
Directors, District Directors, Chief Patrol Agents, Regional and District Counsel, INS, LEGAL 
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policies with respect to prosecutorial discretion since at least the 
1970s,122 in recent years ICE policy leaders have issued a series of 
memoranda expanding on earlier guidance and making the exercise of 
discretion more publically transparent.123  Of particular relevance here, 
the agency has emphasized its expectation that trial attorneys consider 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in all immigration removal 
proceedings,124  paying special attention to cases not yet filed or 
appearing on the master calendar.125 
 As expressed in these memoranda, the agency’s prosecutorial 
discretion policies reflect two, often overlapping, goals.  One is to 
conserve scarce agency resources by declining or deferring cases that 
are low priorities, either because the person is likely to prevail anyway 
or because his or her criminal history or immigration violations are 
minor.126  The other objective is to ensure that ICE attorneys take 
special account of situations in which noncitizens are technically in 
violation of civil immigration laws but have strong humanitarian 
factors militating in favor of discretion.127 
 In prior work, I advanced an additional argument supporting the 
exercise of discretion in removal proceedings where there have been 
                                                                                                             
ACTION CENTER 2 (Nov. 17, 2000), http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/ 
lac/Meissner-2000-memo.pdf. 
 122. See, e.g., Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service Goes Public:  The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information Act, 
14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42 (1976). 
 123. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to All Field Office 
Directors, All Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel, ICE, ICE (June 17, 2011), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf. 
 124. Memorandum from John Morton to All ICE Employees, supra note 3, at 3. 
 125. Memorandum from Peter S. Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, ICE, to All Chief 
Counsel, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, ICE, ICE (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.ice. 
gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/case-by-case-review-incoming-certain-pending-
cases-memorandum.pdf; Next Steps in the Implementation of the Prosecutorial Discretion 
Memorandum and the August 18th Announcement on Immigration Enforcement Priorities, 
ICE, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/pros-discretion-next-steps.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2014); see also SAN ANTONIO OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, ICE, supra note 
107, at 133 (instructing trial attorneys to confirm that individual cases are priorities for 
enforcement before recalendaring cases that had been closed before the Supreme Court 
clarified that its ruling in Padilla v. Kentucky was not retroactive). 
 126. Guidance to ICE Attorneys Reviewing the CBP, USCIS, and ICE Cases Before 
the Executive Office for Immigration Review, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial- 
discretion/guidance-to-ice-attorneys-reviewing-cbp-uscis-ice-cases-before-eoir.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2014); Memorandum from John Morton to All ICE Employees, supra note 3. 
 127. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to All Field Office Directors, Special 
Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel, ICE, ICE (June 17, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/ 
secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf; Memorandum from William J. 
Howard to All Office of the Principal Legal Advisor Chief Counsel, supra note 27. 
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violations of noncitizens’ constitutional rights by arresting officers.128  
Drawing on the work of Lawrence Sager and others, 129 I contend that 
ICE attorneys have a constitutional responsibility to take remedial 
actions in light of the judiciary decision to underenforce violations of 
the Fourth Amendment in removal proceedings.130  The crux of the 
argument is that the judiciary’s self-imposed institutional limitations on 
constitutional enforcement do not limit the strength of the constitu-
tional norm itself.  Accordingly, “where institutional factors inhibit 
robust judicial guardianship of the Constitution, the executive branch’s 
obligation to ensure full enforcement is actually elevated.”131   In 
removal proceedings, this arguably provides another source of the trial 
attorneys’ obligation to see justice done in certain situations. 
 As in other areas of government-enforced benefits and sanctions, 
officials charged with administering immigration law are expected “to 
be at least open to the possibility that a special case is presenting 
itself.”132  Indeed, many of the same congresspersons who enacted 
harsh and restrictive amendments to the immigration statute in the 
1990s expressed surprise and disappointment when it came to light 
that the INS was enforcing those laws in cases where removal was 
“unfair and resulted in unjustifiable hardship.”133  They urged the 
Attorney General and INS Commissioner to employ prosecutorial 
discretion more systematically.134  In Arizona v. United States, the 
                                                 
 128. Cade, supra note 11. 
 129. See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES:  A THEORY OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 84-92 (2004); Russell M. Gold, Beyond the Judicial Fourth 
Amendment:  The Prosecutor’s Role, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1591 (2014); Lawrence Gene 
Sager, Fair Measure:  The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. 
REV. 1212, 1220-21 (1978); David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 128-30 (1993) (explaining that “constitutional law, as developed by 
the Supreme Court, reflects in part the Court’s views of its own institutional capacities” and 
accordingly might differ from constitutional interpretation by the Executive Branch). 
 130. Cade, supra note 11, at 187-98. 
 131. Id. at 192; see also SAGER, supra note 129, at 88, 91-94, 116 (discussing the 
underenforcement thesis); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive 
Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1225 (2006) (stating that when the judiciary is unable to 
fully enforce a constitutional provision, the executive branch bears the burden of enforcing 
the provision more fully); Sager, supra note 129, at 1226-28 (discussing the obligation of 
public officials to use “best efforts” to avoid unconstitutional conduct). 
 132. LIPSKY, supra note 81, at xii. 
 133. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 30, at 780 (quoting Letter from Henry J. Hyde et 
al., Representatives, U.S. Cong., to Janet Reno, Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, & Doris M. 
Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration and Naturalization Serv. (Nov. 4, 1999)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 134. Id. 
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Supreme Court highlighted the central role that discretion plays in the 
removal system: 
Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate 
human concerns.  Unauthorized workers trying to support their 
families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or 
aliens who commit a serious crime.  The equities of an individual case 
may turn on many factors, including whether the alien has children 
born in the United States, long ties to the community, or a record of 
distinguished military service. . . .  Returning an alien to his own 
country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed a 
removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission.135 
 Underlying the importance of each component of ICE 
prosecutors’ duty to see justice done is the significant hardship that 
immigration detention and deportation inflicts on noncitizens and their 
families and communities, as well as on the public fisc.  The logjam in 
underresourced immigration courts produces adjudicative wait times 
that nationally average over 500 days, greatly prolonging the 
disruption and expense of fighting removal proceedings.136  As alluded 
to above,137 laws enacted in the 1990s made civil detention mandatory 
for a wide variety of immigration offenses, and many other persons are 
subject to discretionary detention on the basis of the government’s 
immigration charges.138  In FY2012, 400,000 people were subject to 
                                                 
 135. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (citations omitted); see also Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1999) (“[A]t the time IIRIRA was enacted the 
INS had been engaging in a regular practice (which had come to be known as ‘deferred 
action’) of exercising that discretion for humanitarian reasons or simply for its own 
convenience.”). 
 136. Immigration Court Processing Time by Outcome, TRAC (Aug. 2014), http://trac. 
syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/court_proctime_outcome.php (select “Average 
Days” under the “What to Tabulate” heading) (showing 506 average days to completion in all 
immigration court cases in FY2014).  For individuals ultimately granted adjudicative relief 
from removal in FY2014, the average wait time was 867 days.  Id. 
 137. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 138. Many asylum seekers, for example, and most persons charged with any criminal 
grounds of removal are detained in prison-like conditions for part or all of the pendency of 
proceedings.  See Jails and Jumpsuits:  Transforming the U.S. Immigration Detention 
System—A Two-Year Review, HUM. RTS. FIRST 1-9 (2011), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/pdf/HRF-Jails-and-Jumpsuits-report.pdf (describing the conditions of 
immigration detention); Tortured & Detained:  Survivor Stories of U.S. Immigration 
Detention, CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE 5 (Nov. 2013), http://www.cvt.org/sites/cvt.org/ 
files/Report_TorturedAndDetained_Nov2013.pdf (“[F]rom October 2010 to February 
2013—the United States detained approximately 6,000 survivors of torture as they were 
seeking asylum protection.”).  The average length of detention for all persons in removal 
proceedings is 30 days, while the average length of stay for detained asylum seekers is 102.4 
days.  Jails and Jumpsuits:  Transforming the U.S. Immigration Detention System—A Two-
Year Review, supra, at 13. 
 
 
 
 
28 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:1 
 
civil immigration incarceration, at a cost of $2 billion.139  For many, 
there is no right or privilege more important than remaining in this 
country, and no sanction worse than deportation.140  The impact of 
deportation on those a deportee leaves behind can be severe.141  By any 
measure, then, the immigration system administers benefits and 
sanctions of substantial significance, at great expense to taxpayers.  
Accordingly, ICE trial attorneys’ role as ministers of justice is critically 
important. 
III. PROBLEMS:  DISCRETIONARY DISPARITIES, UNWARRANTED 
DETENTIONS AND REMOVALS, AND OVERZEALOUS TACTICS 
 As described in Part II, ICE prosecutors shoulder significant 
responsibilities.  The enforcement of immigration laws to keep the 
nation safe is a critical agency objective, especially in the wake of the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11.  At the same time, however, trial attorneys 
must exercise discretion in ways that avoid wrongful removals and 
procedures, prioritize scarce resources, and take into account 
“immediate human concerns” when warranted by the equities.142 
 As in all large organizations, especially those with multiple 
objectives, there is significant variation in how ICE trial attorneys 
perceive their role and carry out their work.  Some are conscientious, 
principled, and reasonable; others are lazy, opportunistic, or 
                                                 
 139. John F. Simanski & Lesley M. Sapp, Immigration Enforcement Actions:  2012, 
DHS 1 (Dec. 2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_ 
2012_1.pdf; U.S. Department of Homeland Security Annual Performance Report:  Fiscal 
Years 2011-2013, DHS, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/dhs-congressional-budget-
justification-fy2013.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).  From 1994 to 2011, the number of 
persons held in civil immigration detention increased an astonishing 430%.  See Mary Fan, 
The Case for Crimmigration Reform, 92 N.C. L. REV. 75, 127-28 (2013). 
 140. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 
322-23 (2001); Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 
259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922); see also Pilcher, supra note 40, at 270 (arguing that immigration 
proceedings primarily impact “the trappings of identity:  home, family, community, and self, 
resulting in ‘loss of both property and life; or all that makes life worth living’” (quoting Ng 
Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284)). 
 141. See, e.g., KANSTROOM, supra note 105, at 135-45 (describing the hardship 
wrought by deportation on individuals, families, and communities); KANSTROOM, supra note 
88, at 10 (“The 1996 laws have been severely criticized for the devastation they have wrought 
on families, for their rigidity, and for their retroactivity.”); Forced Apart:  Families Separated 
and Immigrants Harmed by United States Deportation Policy, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 2007), 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0707_web.pdf; Seth Freed Wessler, Shattered 
Families:  The Perilous Intersection of Immigration Enforcement and the Child Welfare 
System, RACE FORWARD (Nov. 2011), http://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/sites/default/ 
files/uploads/ARC_Report_Shattered_Families_FULL_REPORT_NOV2011Release.pdf. 
 142. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012). 
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overzealous.  My aim here is not to define ICE “culture,” much less to 
suggest that agency attorneys are less principled than lawyers working 
in other fields.  But I do seek to show that, whatever the reason may 
be, serious problems mark the on-the-ground handling of immigration 
cases by ICE.  Two problems are of dominating importance.  First, the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion within ICE appears to be highly 
inconsistent across the country, leading to disparate application of the 
agency’s priorities for removal.  Second, many ICE attorneys fail to 
implement their obligations fully to ensure procedural fairness and 
avoid unwarranted detentions or removal proceedings in the handling 
of individual immigration cases. 
A. Inconsistent Use of Prosecutorial Discretion 
 As alluded to above, on June 17, 2011, ICE Director John 
Morton began ramping up an agency-wide initiative to encourage a 
more systematic use of prosecutorial discretion.143  Through a series of 
memoranda setting forth positive and negative factors to be balanced 
in the exercise of discretion and designating categories of persons 
warranting special consideration, Morton hoped to reduce the 
tremendous backlog plaguing the immigration courts, focus the 
agency’s limited resources on high priority targets, and make the 
deportation system as humane as possible.144  Morton emphasized his 
expectation that, even more so than in the past, trial attorneys would 
evaluate all individual removal proceedings for the possible exercise of 
discretion. 
 The prosecutorial discretion initiative got off to a rocky start.  
Four months after the issuance of Director Morton’s June 17 
memoranda, the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) 
collected 252 case submissions from immigration practitioners in 
                                                 
 143. Memorandum from John Morton to All ICE Employees, supra note 3. 
 144. Id.; see also Memorandum from Gary Mead, Exec. Assoc. Dir., Peter S. Vincent, 
Principal Legal Advisor, and James Dinkins, Exec. Assoc. Dir., ICE, to All Field Office 
Directors, Chief Counsel, and Special Agents in Charge, ICE, IMMIGR. EQUALITY, 
http://www.immigrationequality.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/PD-memo-10-5-2012-2.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2014) (“As the Prosecutorial Discretion Memorandum makes clear, one 
of the factors relevant to that assessment is ‘the person’s ties and contributions to the 
community, including family relationships.’”); Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to 
All Employees, ICE, ICE (June 15, 2012), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/ 
s1-certain-young-people-morton.pdf; Memorandum from John Morton to All Field Office 
Directors, All Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel, supra note 123, at 1-2. 
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virtually every jurisdiction.145  The thrust of the feedback was that trial 
attorneys had not altered their discretionary practices in any 
meaningful regard.146  The report provided detailed examples from 
each jurisdiction, which were summarized as follows: 
While practices have improved in a few ICE offices, in the majority of 
offices ICE agents, trial attorneys and supervisors admitted that they 
had not implemented the memoranda and there had been no changes in 
policy or practice.  Many called for additional guidance or instruction 
from headquarters while others felt that they were already exercising 
discretion sufficiently.  Several said they have no intention of 
complying and indicated their jobs are to arrest and deport people.  A 
few ICE attorneys expressed concern about changing current practice 
for fear that it would negatively impact their careers. . . .  Equally 
troublesome, ICE offices are inconsistently interpreting the 
prosecutorial discretion standards set forth in the June memoranda.  
Many ICE offices described the criteria in more narrow terms than the 
memoranda, and some even refused to consider whole categories of 
cases no matter the equities.147 
These accounts from practitioners in the field are supported by data 
later obtained by researchers at Syracuse University, which indicated 
that throughout the country, ICE prosecutors closed only thirteen cases 
in the exercise of discretion between June and December of 2011.148 
 On the heels of this inauspicious beginning, ICE issued three 
additional documents on November 17, 2011, which detailed more 
comprehensively the agency’s motivation for reviewing cases and 
specifically ordered the review of all nondetained cases in two pilot 
jurisdictions.  In addition, these pronouncements called for scenario-
based training programs for all ICE attorneys and offered special 
guidance regarding cases that warranted especially strong reasons for 
the exercise of prosecutorial leniency.149  Over time, the agency’s 
training sessions, guidance documents, and working-group reviews 
                                                 
 145. Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, Holding DHS Accountable on Prosecutorial 
Discretion, ELMORE & PETERSON (Nov. 2011), http://elmoreattorneys.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2011/11/AILA-AIC-Pros-Disc-Report-11.21.11.pdf. 
 146. Id. at 4. 
 147. Id. 
 148. ICE Prosecutorial Discretion Program, TRAC tbl.1 (July 23, 2012), http://trac.syr. 
edu/immigration/reports/287/. 
 149. See Guidance to ICE Attorneys Reviewing the CBP, USCIS, and ICE Cases 
Before the Executive Office for Immigration Review, supra note 126; Memorandum from 
Peter S. Vincent to All Chief Counsel, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, supra note 125; 
Next Steps in the Implementation of the Prosecutorial Discretion Memorandum and the 
August 18th Announcement on Immigration Enforcement Priorities, supra note 125. 
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have gradually increased discretionary case closures.150  In the year 
following the issuance of the Morton memos, ICE prosecutors closed a 
total of 5,684 cases nationwide—about 1.9% of the pending cases.151  
As of August 31, 2014, the total number of closed cases based on 
prosecutorial discretion reached 38,439 (6.8% of all cases closed since 
October 2012).152  This number, while considerably lower than many 
expected, is not negligible.  It has been insufficient, however, to reduce 
the overall workload, as the number of cases pending nationwide in 
immigration courts reached a new high of 408,073 as of August 
2014.153 
 Even more importantly, the national figures do not tell a critical 
part of the story:  case closures based on prosecutorial discretion vary 
dramatically across jurisdictions.  Data secured through Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) requests reveals that, as of August 31, 2014, 
just five of the nation’s sixty courts154 were responsible for over half of 
the total number of immigration case closures.155  Widening the scope 
slightly shows that discretionary closures by ICE attorneys in ten 
courts comprise roughly 70% of such closures nationwide.156  On the 
other side of the coin, in scores of hearing locations, trial attorneys 
almost never exercise prosecutorial discretion, with total case closures 
since Morton’s initiative began in the single digits.157 
                                                 
 150. Historic Drop in Deportation Orders Continues as Immigration Court Backlog 
Increases, TRAC (Apr. 24, 2012), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/279; ICE Prosecu-
torial Discretion Program, supra note 148. 
 151. ICE Prosecutorial Discretion Program, supra note 148, tbl.1; Meghan McCarthy, 
‘Prosecutorial Discretion’ Barely Dents Immigration Case Backlog, TUCSONSENTINEL.COM 
(July 15, 2012, 10:26 AM), http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/local/report/071512_immig_ 
cases/prosecutorial-discretion-barely-dents-immigration-case-backlog/. 
 152. Immigration Court Cases Closed Based on Prosecutorial Discretion, TRAC (Aug. 
31, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/prosdiscretion/. 
 153. Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC (Aug. 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/php 
tools/immigration/court_backlog/. 
 154. EOIR Immigration Court Listing, DOJ, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/sibpages/ 
ICadr.htm (last updated Sept. 2014). 
 155. Immigration Court Cases Closed Based on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 
152 (showing that as of August 31, 2014, there were 19,177 closures based on prosecutorial 
discretion in Los Angeles, Charlotte, Seattle, San Francisco, and New York City, out of a total 
of 38,439 closures nationwide). 
 156. Id. (showing that as of August 31, 2014, there were 26,999 closures based on 
prosecutorial discretion in Los Angeles, Charlotte, Seattle, San Francisco, New York City, 
Orlando, Miami, Phoenix, San Diego, Omaha, and Memphis, out of a total of 38,439 closures 
nationwide). 
 157. Id. 
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 The discretionary closure data suggests significant disparities 
between many courts with similarly sized dockets.158  For example, as 
of August 31, 2014, trial attorneys in Charlotte’s and Seattle’s small 
immigration courts have closed more than 2,000 cases each in the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which was more than 20% of all 
case resolutions since October 2012 in their respective courts.159  Their 
counterparts in comparable Phoenix, Omaha, and Memphis have 
closed more than 1,000 cases each, while trial attorneys in Las Vegas, 
Houston, and Hartford have discontinued prosecutions in 171 or fewer 
cases.160  The contrast between courts with larger dockets is similarly 
stark.  In San Diego and Orlando, trial attorneys have closed 1,300 or 
more cases in the exercise of discretion.161  In Atlanta and Boston the 
number drops to 982 and 747, respectively, while in Newark and 
Dallas discretionary closures are at 466 and 376, respectively.162  There 
are also significant differences in discretionary closures between the 
country’s largest immigration courts:  as of August 31, 2014, ICE 
prosecutors in Los Angeles exercised discretion to close cases in 
11,108 cases, while New York City saw only 1,750 cases closed in the 
same time period.163 
 In short, the data suggests that while some trial attorneys take 
seriously the responsibility of equitable prosecutorial discretion, others 
seem to regard it as optional or nonexistent.  It is beyond the scope of 
this Article to isolate all the potential variables affecting ICE’s 
discretionary closures in immigration court.164  But the differences are 
pronounced and numerous enough to conclude that, at the least, the 
checkerboard implementation of the prosecutorial discretion initiative 
                                                 
 158. For purposes of roughly estimating the size of each court’s docket, I am using the 
number of immigration judges EOIR has assigned to that court. 
 159. Immigration Court Cases Closed Based on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 
152. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Alternative explanations for some of the results are conceivable.  For example, 
trial attorneys working in field offices located in “new-destination” locations—those with 
large numbers of recently arrived immigrants—might theoretically encounter fewer 
noncitizens presenting strong family and community ties than trial attorneys whose 
jurisdiction includes long-established immigrant communities.  Or, as suggested by one ICE 
attorney with whom I spoke, perhaps CBP does a better job in some areas of targeting high 
priority immigrants for arrest, and for that or other reasons NTAs are not often filed in cases 
that would warrant discretion.  See Interview with ICE Trial Attorney in Small Midwestern 
Office, supra note 76.  These theories might explain slight differences in discretionary 
closures, but are not persuasive enough to account for the magnitude of prosecutorial 
discretion discrepancies across so many similar hearing locations. 
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reflects unequal treatment of similarly situated individuals who find 
themselves caught—sometimes improperly—in the workings of the 
nation’s deportation machinery. 
 When trial attorneys do employ prosecutorial discretion, the 
timing and conditions often approximate plea-bargaining in the 
criminal system.  According to numerous anecdotal reports from 
advocates, ICE prosecutors around the country frequently offer to 
close those cases in which noncitizens appear to be eligible for some 
kind of adjudicative relief from deportation, such as cancellation of 
removal or asylum.165  Advocates report that prosecutors often present 
the discretionary closure offer as a “one-bite-at-the-apple” deal, at or 
just before the hearing, and with a demand for an immediate answer.166  
In addition, the form of prosecutorial discretion offered is almost 
invariably administrative closure, rather than termination without 
prejudice or “deferred action.” 167   But noncitizens who receive 
administrative closure generally cannot apply for work authorization168 
or recover their bond money, which averages almost $6,000 
                                                 
 165. See Administrative Closure and Advanced Parole E-mail Posts to Immigration 
Clinical Professor’s List (Apr. 2014) (on file with author) (relating anecdotes from 
immigration clinicians in New York City, Chicago, and Iowa regarding the prevalence of ICE 
attorneys offering prosecutorial discretion in meritorious or strong asylum cases); see N.Y. 
Immigration Coal. & N.Y. Cnty. Lawyer’s Ass’n, Prosecutorial Indiscretion:  How the 
Prosecutorial Discretion Policy Failed To Keep Its Promise, N.Y. IMMIGR. COALITION 14 (Jan. 
2013), http://www.thenyic.org/sites/default/files/Prosecutorial%20Indiscretion%201-10-Final. 
pdf (“Our data also showed that ICE frequently offered an exercise of discretion to 
individuals who appeared likely to win their immigration cases and obtain more lasting forms 
of relief . . . .”); Prosecutorial Discretion:  A Statistical Assessment, IMMIGR. POL’Y CENTER 3 
(June 11, 2012), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/prosecutorial-discretion-statistical-
analysis (“DHS sources have said that of the 3,998 immigrants who have declined offers of 
administrative closure, more than 3,000 may be eligible for ‘cancellation of removal’ . . . .”); 
Prosecutorial Discretion Implementation:  Synthesis of Chapter Reports, AILA 3-5, 
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=38125 (last updated Jan. 31, 2012). 
 166. Prosecutorial Discretion Implementation:  Synthesis of Chapter Reports, supra 
note 165, at 2-4 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Administrative Closure and 
Advanced Parole Posts to Immigration Clinical Professor’s List, supra note 165 (including an 
e-mail from Geoffrey Heeren, Assistant Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of 
Law, on April 2, 2014, regarding an incident in which the ICE attorney offered administrative 
closure to his client just before the asylum hearing began and gave him only ten minutes to 
decide). 
 167. Prosecutorial Discretion Implementation:  Synthesis of Chapter Reports, supra 
note 165, at 6-8. 
 168. Noncitizens who benefit from a form of enforcement discretion called deferred 
action are eligible to apply for work authorization, but administrative closure does not require 
ICE to offer deferred action.  See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2014).  See generally 6 CHARLES 
GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR & RONALD Y. WADA, IMMIGRATION LAW 
AND PROCEDURE § 72.03[2][h] (2014) (describing deferred action as a form of administrative 
discretionary relief from deportation at various stages of immigration proceedings). 
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nationwide.169  As a result, they often face the difficult choice of 
accepting uncertain respite and losing substantial funds or facing ICE 
in an adversarial proceeding subject to informational disparities.170  In 
short, some trial attorneys primarily use discretionary closure not to 
buffer overly harsh applications of immigration law in low-priority 
cases, but rather to avoid having to litigate hearings when the 
noncitizen may be eligible for more far-reaching relief. 
B. Erroneous Charges 
 The government’s most egregious errors in the context of removal 
proceedings involve the detention and deportation of U.S. citizens.  It 
is unclear how many citizens are subjected to immigration proceedings 
each year, but the number is not insignificant.171   The Florence 
Immigration and Refugee Rights Project has estimated that each 
month, forty or fifty local detainees present facially valid claims to 
U.S. citizenship.172  Political scientist Jacqueline Stevens has estimated 
that approximately 1% of detained persons charged with removability 
have eventually been found to be U.S. citizens and that another .05% 
of those already deported from the country have U.S. citizenship.173  As 
Professor Daniel Kanstroom has observed, if Stevens is correct, then 
                                                 
 169. Jailed Without Justice:  Immigration Detention in the USA, AMNESTY INT’L 17-
19, http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2014) 
(reporting that the national average for immigration bonds is $5,941); Peter L. Markowitz et 
al., Accessing Justice:  The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Immigration 
Proceedings, CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 13 (Dec. 2011), http://www.cardozolawreview.com/ 
content/denovo/NYIRS_Report.pdf (reporting that judges in New York set immigration 
bonds at an average of $10,000, despite being authorized to release many individuals on their 
own recognizance or to set bail as low as $1,500); Prosecutorial Discretion Implementation:  
Synthesis of Chapter Reports, supra note 165, at 8. 
 170. See infra Part III.C (discussing discovery asymmetries in immigration courts); 
see also Administrative Closure and Advanced Parole E-mail Posts to Immigration Clinical 
Professor’s List, supra note 165. 
 171. See, e.g., Andrew Becker & Patrick J. McDonnell, U.S. Citizens Caught Up in 
Immigration Sweeps, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/09/ 
nation/na-citizen9; Tyche Hendricks, Suits for Wrongful Deportation by ICE Rise, S.F. GATE 
(July 28, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Suits-for-wrongful-deporta 
tion-by-ICE-rise-3291314.php (reporting on hundreds of U.S. citizens subjected to detention 
and deportation proceedings). 
 172. See Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention, and Removal Procedures:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. & Int’l 
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 37 (2008) (testimony of Kara Hartzler, 
Esq., Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project). 
 173. Stevens, supra note 105, at 622, 624; see Jacqueline Stevens, Thin ICE, NATION 
(June 5, 2008), http://www.thenation.com/article/thin-ice. 
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ICE may have held as many as 20,000 U.S. citizens in detention since 
2003 and actually deported thousands of them.174 
 Noncitizens are also subjected to erroneous removal actions.  In 
some cases, the charging document alleges grounds for removability 
that are not justified by the noncitizen’s conduct.  As mentioned, trial 
attorneys often do not make the decision to file the NTA or the initial 
determination of which charges to allege.  They always have the 
authority, however, to amend the grounds of removability, and revised 
charges are often filed.  Yet little constrains trial attorneys from 
proceeding with erroneous or overblown allegations.175 
 Moncrieffe v. Holder presents a recent example of government 
overcharging.176  In Adrian Moncrieffe’s removal proceedings, ICE 
alleged that a low-level drug offense, criminalizing both social sharing 
of a small amount of marijuana and distribution for remuneration, 
should presumptively be considered an aggravated felony, thereby 
rendering Moncrieffe not only deportable but also ineligible for 
discretionary relief and subject to mandatory detention.  The Supreme 
Court ultimately rejected the government’s position, noting:  “This is 
the third time in seven years that we have considered whether the 
Government has properly characterized a low-level drug offense as 
‘illicit trafficking in a controlled substance,’ and thus an ‘aggravated 
felony.’  Once again we hold that the Government’s approach defies 
‘the commonsense conception’ of these terms.”177 
 Similarly, in Leocal v. Ashcroft, the government alleged that 
Josue Leocal’s DUI conviction was a crime of violence, making him 
deportable as an aggravated felon.178  When the case eventually reached 
the Supreme Court—after Leocal had already been deported to 
Haiti—Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous 
Court, completely rejected the government’s position, finding the 
                                                 
 174. KANSTROOM, supra note 105, at 100. 
 175. To File or Not To File a Notice To Appear:  Improving the Government’s Use of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, PENN ST. L. 51-52 (Oct. 2013), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/ 
default/files/documents/pdfs/NTAReportFinal.pdf (quoting retired Immigration Judge Bruce 
Einhorn). 
 176. 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013). 
 177. Id. at 1693 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Carachuri-Rosendo v. 
Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010) (rejecting ICE’s position that a second simple drug possession 
offense constitutes an aggravated felony where the second conviction was not based on the 
fact of a prior conviction); Lopez v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47 (2006) (rejecting the government’s 
argument that a drug possession conviction punishable as a misdemeanor under federal law 
qualifies as an “illicit trafficking” aggravated felony if punishable as a felony under state 
law). 
 178. 543 U.S. 1 (2004). 
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question not even close.179   Other federal courts have noted the 
government’s tendency to stretch legal arguments when attempting to 
remove noncitizens it believes are undesirable.180 
 Most of the cases in which ICE loses on the merits of 
removability never reach the federal courts.  But in fact, data recently 
obtained through the FOIA shows that in recent years, immigration 
judges ultimately reject ICE’s request for a removal order almost 50% 
of the time181—up from an already high rejection of one of every four 
cases from FY2001 to FY2010.182   While there may be reasons 
immigration judges terminate cases that would not signal prosecutorial 
missteps, the 50% figure suggests that in many cases ICE proceeds on 
inaccurate charges or should not be pursuing deportation at all.  By 
way of a very rough comparison, only one out of ten federal criminal 
prosecutions did not end in a conviction in 2009.183  The contrast is 
even starker when one considers that the government’s burden of proof 
in civil immigration cases is considerably lower than in criminal 
prosecutions,184 and the fact that immigration judges—themselves DOJ 
lawyers—are frequently the subject of criticism for abuses and 
enforcement biases.185  Every year the BIA reverses and remands 
                                                 
 179. Id. at 11. 
 180. See, e.g., Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1100 (9th Cir. 2012) (“In other 
words, the government’s position is that the word ‘legitimation’ should be read broadly when 
a broad reading results in the denial of citizenship, and narrowly when a narrow reading 
results in the denial of citizenship.”). 
 181. ICE Targeting:  Odds Noncitizens Ordered Deported by Immigration Judge, 
TRAC (Aug. 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/apprep_outcome_ 
leave.php. 
 182. Id.; see also ICE Seeks To Deport the Wrong People, TRAC fig.1 & accompany-
ing tabular data (Nov. 9, 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/243/ (stating that the 
rejection rate for ICE removal requests increased to 31%). 
 183. See Mark Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics, 2009, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 2 (Dec. 
2011),  http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf.  Note, however, the win-loss statistics 
on formal removal orders do not include the over 100,000 expedited removals that occur 
outside of formal immigration courts each year.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) (2012) (certain 
arriving aliens seeking admission are subject to expedited removal procedures); Simanski & 
Sapp, supra note 139, at 5 tbl.6. 
 184. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 185. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 71, at 1675 (citing opinions by courts of appeals 
criticizing immigration judges for “incompetence, bias, hostility, intimidation, abuse, and 
other unprofessional conduct”); Jacqueline Stevens, Lawless Courts, NATION (Oct. 20, 2010), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/155497/lawless-courts (describing unprofessional, abusive, 
and potentially unethical conduct by immigration judges); see also Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., 
Refugee Roulette:  Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007) 
(showing significant disparities in the adjudication of asylum for similarly situated individu-
als across and within immigration courts). 
 
 
 
 
2014] JUSTICE IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 37 
 
thousands of immigration judges’ decisions on the merits that went in 
favor of DHS.186 
 Although some noncitizens prevail, charging decisions can affect 
the outcome of removal proceedings.  As mentioned, almost all 
criminal grounds of removal trigger mandatory detention.187  Some 
studies have demonstrated that civil detention impedes a noncitizen’s 
chance of success in removal proceedings, as does a lack of legal 
representation.188  In New York’s immigration courts, for example, 74% 
of nondetained, represented noncitizens were successful. 189   The 
success rate dropped to 18% for represented noncitizens held in 
detention, while only 3% of detained noncitizens without counsel 
avoided removal.190  Other data supports the influence of detention on 
immigration court outcomes.191 
 Detainees have more difficulty winning cases for multiple 
reasons.  To be sure, a larger percentage of detained noncitizens will 
have criminal history that makes it more difficult to obtain 
discretionary relief from removal.192  But it is also relevant that they are 
routinely transferred thousands of miles from their communities, 
sometimes multiple times, to public and private prisons.193  Sometimes 
noncitizens are transferred to jurisdictions with less favorable case 
                                                 
 186. According to data that I obtained from EOIR through a FOIA request, in FY2011 
the BIA remanded (for reasons other than a background check) 2,763 noncitizen appeals of 
immigration judges’ orders.  That same year, the BIA terminated proceedings or granted 
temporary protected status or voluntary departure (without first dismissing the noncitizen’s 
appeal) in 181 cases.  In FY2012, the BIA remanded (for reasons other than a background 
check) 2,605 noncitizen appeals and terminated proceedings or granted temporary protected 
status or voluntary departure in 192 cases.  An additional 232 cases appealed by noncitizens 
in FY2012 were administratively closed by DHS, while 54 more were administratively closed 
by the BIA.  See Letter from Cyrstal Souza, Supervisory Gov’t Info. Specialist, EOIR, to 
Thomas Striepe, Faculty Servs. Librarian, Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law (Aug. 26, 2013) (on file 
with author).  Of course, more often the BIA rules in favor of DHS.  Id. 
 187. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).  Many crimes classified as misdemeanors, for example, 
domestic offenses and petty shoplifting, have been determined to be “aggravated felonies” for 
purposes of removal proceedings.  See generally Cade, supra note 12. 
 188. See, e.g., Markowitz et al., supra note 169. 
 189. Id. at 19. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See ICE Seeks To Deport the Wrong People, supra note 182, fig.3 & 
accompanying tbl. (reporting removal rejection rates for FY2010 in the Houston-Detained 
court (only 6% rejected) versus the non-detained Houston Immigration Court (40% rejected), 
although the data does not indicate how many of these persons were represented). 
 192. See Markowitz et al., supra note 169. 
 193. A Costly Move, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 14, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/ 
reports/2011/06/14/costly-move; Markowitz et al., supra note 169. 
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law.194  The conditions and duration of incarceration can make it 
difficult to access counsel, evidence, or support networks, and thus 
wear down resolve.195  Not surprisingly, noncitizens often give up their 
right to fight removal or contest inaccurate charges that trigger harsher 
penalties (like permanent banishment) in order to get out of 
detention.196  Thus, ICE’s pursuit of inflated or inaccurate grounds of 
removal may lead to outcome-determinative process costs.  This 
dynamic calls to mind Malcom Feeley’s classic study of Connecticut 
misdemeanor courts, which led him to conclude that defendants were 
motivated to plead guilty to escape the process of contesting minor 
offenses—with its repeated delays, pretrial detention, and so on—
rather than to escape any possible penal sanction.197  Given the high 
number of removal cases involving detained noncitizens—
                                                 
 194. See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 2-3, Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 
1678 (2013) (No. 11-702) (collecting BIA cases involving immigrants convicted of the same 
New York marijuana crime and demonstrating that those transferred to detention facilities 
located in the Fifth Circuit were deemed to have committed an aggravated felony, while 
noncitizens detained in the Second and Third Circuits, prevailed on that issue). 
 195. See, e.g., Stacy Caplow, After the Flood:  The Legacy of the “Surge” of Federal 
Immigration Appeals, 7 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 25-26 (2012); Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers 
to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation:  Varick Street Detention 
Facility, a Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 548 (2009); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
LOCKED UP FAR AWAY:  THE TRANSFER OF IMMIGRANTS TO REMOTE DETENTION CENTERS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 41-57 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 
us1209webwcover.pdf; Jails and Jumpsuits:  Transforming the U.S. Immigration Detention 
System—A Two-Year Review, supra note 138; see also Markowitz et al., supra note 169, at 4, 
9-11 (showing dramatic drops in representation rates for noncitizen residents of New York 
City transferred to immigration court venues outside of New York City).  In the New York 
study, representation made a significant difference in the success rate, even for those detained 
and transferred out of state.  See id. at 21 & tbl.6.  Further, access to counsel dramatically 
improved the likelihood of detainee success across all classifications of relief applications, as 
well as where no relief was requested at all.  Id. at 20 & tbl.5.  This suggests that some 
nonnegligible portion of detained noncitizens have been erroneously charged—a problem not 
easily overcome without the assistance of an attorney. 
 196. See, e.g., Cade, supra note 12, at 1801-02 (discussing the example of a detained 
noncitizen who gave up fighting despite the likelihood of inaccurate removal charges); 
Elizabeth Keyes, Zealous Advocacy:  Pushing Against the Borders in Immigration Litigation, 
44 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (on file with author) (“[V]ery difficult detention 
conditions create a strong incentive to agree to any option that will end the detention quickly, 
and provides a strong disincentive to exercising rights of appeal, which can stretch a period of 
detention out for months longer.” (footnote omitted)). 
 197. MALCOM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (1979); see also Josh 
Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (2008) (discussing the “innocence 
problem” in plea bargaining).  While in theory the process of fighting removal while subject 
to lengthy detention in prison conditions might not outweigh the sanction of permanent 
banishment on the aggravated felony removal ground, it is easy to see how many noncitizens 
faced with such costs would throw in the towel, regardless of whether their removal charges 
are warranted or accurate. 
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approximately 36%—the impact of ICE’s charging decisions may be 
widespread.198 
C. Exploitation of Discovery Asymmetries 
 There is little formal discovery in immigration court, and the 
procedures that do exist are a patchwork of statutory provisions, court 
rules, and regulations.199  Nevertheless, the INA does impose important 
(if limited) disclosure obligations on the government.  First, 
noncitizens must be provided with “a reasonable opportunity to 
examine the evidence against [them].”200  Second, a noncitizen seeking 
to prove a right to stay in the United States should have access to all 
“records and documents, not considered by the Attorney General to be 
confidential, pertaining to the [noncitizen’s] admission or presence in 
the United States.”201   Additionally, the BIA has noted the trial 
attorneys’ responsibility to help develop full records by sharing 
relevant evidence in their possession, especially in asylum cases.202  
Courts and commentators have noted similar disclosure obligations for 
government attorneys enforcing civil law in other contexts.203 
 Despite these expectations and obligations, ICE prosecutors 
regularly decline to provide noncitizens with relevant documents, 
allowing them to exploit significant informational asymmetries.204  
Trial attorneys preparing to present evidence or cross-examine a 
noncitizen in a removal proceeding have access to vast amounts of 
information in the A-file, including all prior applications, entry and 
exit data, interview notes, statements, medical examinations, tax 
forms, and criminal records.205  By ignoring disclosure obligations, 
they increase their opportunity to prevail through unfair surprise or 
because of the noncitizen’s inability to obtain documents rebutting the 
                                                 
 198. Office of Planning, Analysis, & Tech., FY2012 Statistical Year Book, DOJ O1 
(Mar. 2013),  http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy12syb.pdf. 
 199. Heeren, supra note 13, at 1581-1600. 
 200. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2012). 
 201. Id. § 1229a(c)(2)(B). 
 202. See In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 726-27, 738-39 (B.I.A. 1997); discussion 
supra Part II.C.2. 
 203. See, e.g., Douglas v. Donovan, 704 F.2d 1276, 1279-80 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing 
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1980)); Berenson, supra note 100, at 19 
(discussing and citing cases in support of the “civil obligation” to inform the court or the 
opposing party about facts known to the government lawyer that might affect the outcome of 
the litigation). 
 204. Heeren, supra note 13, at 1571-1600. 
 205. Id. at 1603-07. 
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government’s charges or supporting claims for discretionary relief 
from removal.206 
 As a practical matter, trial attorneys generally force noncitizens or 
their attorneys to use the FOIA to obtain any part of the government’s 
A-file.207  Properly filing FOIA requests with the correct federal 
agency or agencies is cumbersome and prone to both bureaucratic and 
requester errors.208  Additionally, FOIA requests for immigration files 
must slowly tread through significant backlogs.209  Even after responses 
finally arrive, they are sometimes heavily redacted, and the 
noncitizen’s only recourse for determining whether such redactions are 
proper is litigation in federal court.210  Thus, the efficacy of this means 
of discovery is haphazard at best. 
 Sometimes ICE prosecutors withhold documents in the 
government’s possession that directly bear on whether a noncitizen 
should be deported.  A recent case concerned a pro se man named 
Sazar Dent who claimed he was a U.S. citizen through adoption, which 
would preclude the government from deporting him to Honduras on 
criminal grounds.211  With a substantial amount of difficulty, the 
incarcerated Dent was able to obtain his twenty-year-old adoption 
records, as well as his school records in the United States.212  But the 
trial attorney in the case argued that Dent had not proven that his 
adoptive mother was a citizen, and when Dent was unable to produce 
her birth certificate, the immigration judge ordered him removed.213  In 
a separate (later-aborted) criminal illegal-entry prosecution conducted 
while his immigration appeals were pending, Dent’s federal defender 
discovered that since the beginning of the deportation case the 
government had been aware of documents in the A-file directly related 
                                                 
 206. Id. at 1569-70. 
 207. Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 374 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting the government’s 
position that noncitizens can only obtain records about themselves held by the government 
through FOIA requests); Heeren, supra note 13, at 1571-99; Assembly Line Injustice:  
Blueprint To Reform America’s Immigration Courts, APPLESEED 25 (May 2009), 
http://appleseednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Assembly-Line-Injustice-Blueprint-
to-Reform-Americas-Immigration-Courts1.pdf. 
 208. Heeren, supra note 13, at 1571-96. 
 209. As of June 2013, ICE had a backlog of 6,699 unanswered requests for 
immigration records, half of which had been pending for 116 days or longer.  See Poor ICE 
FOIA Management Hinders Public Access to Immigration Records, FOIA PROJECT (July 18, 
2013), http://foiaproject.org/2013/07/18/poor-management-hinders-public-access-to-immigra 
tion-records/. 
 210. Heeren, supra note 13, at 1597-99. 
 211. Dent, 627 F.3d 365. 
 212. Id. at 369. 
 213. Id. at 369-70. 
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to his claims of citizenship, including the naturalization petition his 
mother filed on his behalf when he was fourteen.214  The deportation 
case eventually found its way to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, where the government acknowledged that ICE had 
been aware of the relevant documents but argued that no law required 
them to be disclosed.215  The Court disagreed,216 holding that the INA 
establishes a “mandatory access” right to the A-file.217 
 Dent v. Holder is noteworthy for what it reveals about the way 
some trial attorneys deal with evidence in the government’s possession 
that might undermine the legitimacy of a particular deportation 
proceeding.  Even if the statutory disclosure obligation is ambiguous, 
trial attorneys are trained that principles of fairness should guide their 
duty to help respondents obtain procedural rights or statutory benefits.  
Nevertheless, ICE attorneys have argued that Dent is applicable only in 
the Ninth Circuit, and even there, many prosecutors reportedly 
continue to ignore the A-file disclosure rule or apply it narrowly.218  
Such actions are hard to square with the duty to seek justice, but from 
the perspective of dogged enforcement it is easy to see why such 
tactics are deployed.  Declining to provide discovery gives trial 
attorneys a significant informational advantage over noncitizens, 
facilitating surprise cross-examinations and limiting the noncitizen’s 
access to documents that might rebut the government’s charges or bear 
on eligibility for relief. 
D. Other Hardball Tactics 
 Withholding relevant documents in the noncitizen’s A-file is not 
the only prosecutorial tactic that some trial attorneys use to prioritize 
winning over the development of a full and fair record.  For many 
years, court observation studies, anecdotal reports, and judicial 
decisions have suggested that ICE prosecutors often litigate in ways 
                                                 
 214. Id. at 372. 
 215. Id. at 370-73. 
 216. Id. at 373-75 (finding a violation of due process and transferring the matter to 
district court to adjudicate whether Dent had become a naturalized citizen). 
 217. Id. at 374-75 (“We construe the ‘shall have access’ statute to provide a rule for 
removal proceedings . . . .  We are unable to imagine a good reason for not producing the A-
file routinely without a request, but another case may address that issue when facts call for 
it.”). 
 218. See Heeren, supra note 13, at 1571-72; Am. Immigration Council, Practice 
Advisory, LEGAL ACTION CENTER 4 (June 12, 2012), http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/ 
default/files/dent_practice_advisory_6-8-12.pdf. 
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that capitalize on surprise, mistakes, and the vulnerability of 
noncitizens.  This Subpart briefly surveys some of those accounts. 
 In the late 1980s, Professor Deborah Anker and other researchers 
studied the adjudication of 193 hearings involving 149 asylum seekers 
in one jurisdiction.219  In all 149 cases, the INS prosecutors “took an 
oppositional stance.”220  While a few trial attorneys were observed to 
conduct professional and respectful cross-examinations, most were 
“hostile, sarcastic, or disbelieving.”221  In hearing after hearing, the 
prosecutors’ cross-examinations attacked the applicants’ moral 
character, rather than addressing eligibility for asylum, and were 
“lengthy and aggressive.”222  Trial attorneys employed tactics “to block 
the applicant from elaborating or explaining her answer and seemed to 
have as their purpose portraying the applicant as evasive.”223 
 Prosecutorial tactics that focused on obtaining removal orders 
through any means necessary, rather than developing and testing the 
merits of the asylum claim, were commonly observed.224  In one case, 
for example, the trial attorney disclosed to a court observer that he was 
aware the immigration judge had made a substantial error of law that 
would have otherwise allowed the noncitizen to avoid a deportation 
order, but felt it was not his responsibility to inform the court or the 
noncitizen.225  In another, the judge ordered a noncitizen removed in 
absentia when his counsel arrived late for the hearing, but stated he 
would reopen the proceedings if the government consented.  The trial 
attorney refused to consent, and when interviewed by the researchers 
after the hearing he was frank:  “[INS] wants a deport[ation] order.  We 
couldn’t have done better.”226 
 More recent interview- and observation-based reports suggest 
that little constrains ICE prosecutors from employing the same sort of 
sharp tactics that Professor Anker observed, if they wish to.  One set of 
                                                 
 219. Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States:  A Case 
Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 
19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 443-45 (1992) (observing asylum adjudication 
proceedings and interviewing hearing participants and other government officials between 
February 1987 and November 1988).  To protect the anonymity of participants in the study, 
Professor Anker revealed only that the immigration court studied was in a major urban center.  
Id. at 443 n.31. 
 220. Id. at 492.  This included a case where the United States Department of State had 
issued a visa to allow the noncitizen to flee persecution in Colombia.  Id. at 492 n.259. 
 221. Id. at 493. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 490-96. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 491 & n.256. 
 226. Id. at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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findings came from a study conducted in 2009 by the Chicago 
Appleseed Fund for Justice, in partnership with several major law 
firms.227  According to the report, over 100 lawyers and 22 professional 
staff members from Latham & Watkins LLP, and Akin Gump Strauss 
Hauer & Feld LLP observed more than 100 hours of immigration 
court hearings and conducted in excess of 100 interviews of 
practitioners, government players, nonprofit officials, professional 
organization leaders, and academics, covering a range of jurisdictions 
throughout the country.228 
 Many of those interviewed expressed the belief that some ICE 
prosecutors “invariably seek the worst outcome possible for the 
immigrant and unnecessarily drag out cases by litigating every 
issue.”229  Advocates encountered trial attorneys who rarely return 
phone calls or other communications, refuse to negotiate in order to 
narrow issues, fail to drop weak cases, and take extreme positions on 
removability.230  In one proceeding cited by the report, ICE contended 
that a noncitizen provided “material support” to terrorists based solely 
on the fact that Burundi rebels robbed him of four dollars and his 
lunch.231  The report concluded that many ICE prosecutors operate with 
a “deport-in-all-cases” mindset.232 
 After conducting a follow-up national study in 2011 and 2012,233 
Chicago Appleseed reported other examples of ICE prosecutors 
indiscriminately seeking deportation, rarely agreeing to discuss issues 
in advance of hearings, and declining to stipulate to obvious issues.234  
One New York area immigration practitioner stated that “in twelve 
years of practice in this area, I have one time had a call returned from a 
[DHS trial attorney] before the hearing.  One time.”235  Notably, even 
the information gathered from government stakeholders themselves 
generally supported these observations.236 
                                                 
 227. See Assembly Line Injustice:  Blueprint To Reform America’s Immigration 
Courts, supra note 207. 
 228. Id. at 1-2. 
 229. Id. at 16. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Cavendish & Schulman, supra note 97, at 39-48.  The 2012 report appears to have 
been based on more extensive participation from government stakeholders than the 2009 
report.  Id. at 12 (describing the report’s methodology). 
 234. Id. at 42-43, 47. 
 235. Id. at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 236. See id. at 46-47 (discussing the prevalence of chief counsel offices not having any 
policy or practice on prehearing conferences or other communications with defense counsel). 
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 A 2010 report for the American Bar Association (ABA) reached 
similar conclusions about the immigration system.237  It found, “Many 
believe that . . . DHS attorneys do not exercise prosecutorial discretion 
to promote efficiency or fairness in removal proceedings.”238  In one 
example cited by the report, an ICE attorney privately acknowledged 
the strength of a noncitizen’s asylum case but contested it anyway and 
refused to stipulate to any facts.239  Various federal judges240 and law 
professors with extensive experience in immigration courts241 have also 
observed the aggressively hard-nosed approach often taken by 
government attorneys in deportation proceedings.  A recent federal 
lawsuit concerning an immigration case in which the BIA found 
evidence of “document tampering” by a Seattle ICE prosecutor 
                                                 
 237. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 57.  The report was generated after a year of 
study by fifty Arnold & Porter LLP lawyers and legal assistants, who participated in the pro 
bono project “without preconceived notions or conclusions.”  Id. at v-vi.  According to the 
ABA, the study consisted of interviews with participants from all perspectives in the removal 
adjudication system, as well as an extensive review of reports, articles, legislative materials, 
and other documents.  Id. at vi. 
 238. Id. at 1-28. 
 239. Id. at 1-29. 
 240. See, e.g., Flores v. USCIS, 718 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2013) (“We are disturbed 
by the Government’s incessant and injudicious opposition in [immigration] cases like this, 
where the only purpose seems to be a general policy of opposition for the sake of 
opposition.”); Diric v. INS, 400 F.2d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1968) (Ely, J. concurring) (“It 
distresses me that an alien must depart our country with the justified impression that the 
Government of the United States, through an over-zealous advocate, has been unnecessarily 
unkind, if not abusive.”). 
 241. See, e.g., KANSTROOM, supra note 105, at 97-98; Bill Ong Hing, The Failure of 
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Deportation of Oscar Martinez, 15 SCHOLAR:  ST. MARY’S L. 
REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 437, 530 (2013) (“I continue to learn after years of handling 
cases, observing the agency, and talking with other practitioners, that relying on 
administrative good faith is a mistake . . . .”); Kidane, supra note 15, at 655 (“[I]n deportation 
proceedings . . . the combatants are the government’s ‘gladiator-attorneys’ who are not 
primarily crusading after the truth, but seeking to win on the one hand, and the unrepresented 
noncitizen on the other hand.” (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye):  Stipulated Orders of Removal and the 
Crisis in Immigration Adjudication, 91 N.C. L. REV. 475, 536 (2013) (“DHS attorneys also 
operate within a courtroom culture marked by a severe absence of stipulations and 
discussions with respondents, even those with counsel, to settle on an outcome that reflects an 
arms’ length negotiation between both parties.”); Philip G. Schrag et al., Rejecting Refugees:  
Homeland Security’s Administration of the One-Year Bar to Asylum, 52 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 651, 661 n.24 (2010) (“[I]n the vast majority of cases, DHS attorneys challenge 
applicants’ corroborating evidence, cross-examine applicants to elicit contradictions, argue 
that applicants do not meet the statutory standards for asylum, and in other ways vigorously 
oppose a grant of asylum, treating asylum applications in immigration court like other forms 
of contested civil or criminal litigation, even when applicants are unable to afford or obtain 
representation.”). 
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suggests some trial attorneys may be willing to go to even greater 
lengths to remove noncitizens.242 
 As should be clear, the anecdotal nature of these observations 
suggests they should be evaluated with caution.  We simply do not 
have competent data from which to form generalizations about ICE’s 
culture.  Indeed, my own encounters with the chief counsel’s office in 
New York City over a period of four years were mixed.243  But these 
positive accounts do permit a critical observation:  ICE attorneys can 
take a no-holds-barred approach if they so choose.  No serious 
structural constraints impede large numbers of government lawyers 
from going full throttle in seeking deportations, even when doing so 
raises serious questions of procedural fairness and substantive justice. 
 While winning at all costs may be par for the course in much civil 
litigation brought by private parties, government attorneys with a role 
as ministers of justice must temper hardball tactics, especially in 
settings where the targets of their efforts are often poor and 
unrepresented.244  Advancing justice requires government attorneys to 
facilitate the development of full and fair records and to refrain from 
exploiting power asymmetries that favor the government.245  And, as we 
have seen, a variety of legal sources make such obligations concrete 
                                                 
 242. See Complaint for Damages, Lanuza v. Love, No. 2:14-cv-01641-MJP (W.D. 
Wash. Oct. 23, 2014); Liz Jones, Lawsuit Claims ICE Attorney Manufactured Evidence in 
Seattle Deportation Case, KUOW.ORG (Oct. 23, 2014, 3:23 PM), http://kuow.org/post/lawsuit-
claims-ice-attorney-manufactured-evidence-seattle-deportation-case. 
 243. While a few assistant chief counsels in New York City’s immigration court 
returned phone calls or e-mails, stipulated to issues, and joined motions in compelling cases, 
others took a zero-tolerance approach to seemingly every case.  In one example of the latter, I 
represented a sixteen-year-old Haitian girl with a slight developmental disability who was 
adjusting her status to that of a lawful permanent resident based on adoption by American 
parents.  Although her only negative history was a trespass violation (incurred while changing 
into clothes forbidden by her adoptive parents behind a neighbor’s house on the way to 
school), the trial attorney conducted an aggressive and lengthy cross-examination, apparently 
fishing for evidence of my client’s involvement with guns, gangs, or drugs.  Eventually the 
interrogation concluded, and the immigration judge granted my client lawful permanent 
resident status.  In another case involving this same attorney, the immigration judge 
terminated the proceedings due to CBP’s violation of my client’s due process rights.  
Although she was a minor child living with lawfully present relatives and had no criminal 
history, the attorney had arranged for CBP officers to be present outside the hearing to 
rearrest her should she prevail in the termination hearing. 
 244. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. New Enter. Stone & Lime Co., 74 
F.R.D. 628, 632-35 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (noting the government’s obligation to seek justice 
applies in civil enforcement actions, likening the government attorney’s overzealous and 
“vexatious” tactics to “hunting mice with an elephant gun,” and awarding attorney’s fees to 
the defending party). 
 245. See, e.g., In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 1997); MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1980); Berenson, supra note 100, at 29-30 (citing City of 
Los Angeles v. Decker, 558 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1977)); Green, supra note 101, at 265-67. 
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for ICE prosecutors.246  As we have also seen, however, trial attorneys 
can, and sometimes do, proceed with cases that have been 
inadequately screened for merit, accuracy, or the exercise of equitable 
discretion. 
IV. PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
 Having explored many of the potential ways that trial attorneys 
can depart from their duty to pursue justice, we can now consider 
possible sources of the problem.  Since Max Weber’s pioneering work 
on bureaucracies in the 1920s,247 many political scientists and legal 
scholars have expanded upon his insight that an organization’s design 
impacts the behavior of its members.248  The institutional, financial, and 
political factors that influence how bureaucracies operate are often 
variable and difficult to measure.249  In most settings, however, certain 
organizational features tend to be particularly salient.  These include:  
(1) the agency’s mission, (2) the resources available to the agency’s 
frontline workers, (3) patterns of practice within the agency, and 
(4) accountability and performance measures.250  Although it is beyond 
the scope of this Article to examine comprehensively the extent to 
which these features shape the behavior of ICE trial attorneys, their 
connection with the problems discussed in Part III is readily 
apparent.251 
 In particular, ICE prosecutors’ enforcement bias and excessive 
workloads go a long way toward explaining the inconsistent 
fulfillment of justice obligations.  I consider the role of enforcement 
bias in Part IV.A and the role of excessive workloads in Part IV.B.  The 
                                                 
 246. See discussion supra Part II.C.2. 
 247. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 
Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1978). 
 248. See, e.g., LIPSKY, supra note 81; JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 
(1983) [hereinafter MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE]; JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985) [hereinafter MASHAW, DUE PROCESS]; PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY:  DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006); 
JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY:  WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 
(1989); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:  Lessons 
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009); Jody Freeman, Collaborative 
Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997). 
 249. See, e.g., MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 248, at 13 (summarizing 
James Q. Wilson’s argument that “regulatory activities and the politics that produce 
regulatory legislation are too varied to be explained satisfactorily by a parsimonious set of 
hypotheses”). 
 250. LIPSKY, supra note 81, at 27-28; see WILSON, supra note 248, at 23-28. 
 251. For an analysis of how James Q. Wilson’s theory of bureaucracy maps onto ICE’s 
broader culture, see Rabin, supra note 13. 
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centrality of these forces in immigration enforcement points to an 
important parallel with the operation of government agencies engaged 
in criminal prosecution, to which I turn in Part IV.C. 
A. Enforcement Bias 
 Prosecutors prosecute.  Their core mission, shared by others with 
whom they work, focuses on law enforcement.  Consequently, as many 
experts have noted, a “prosecutor bias” can take hold at the expense of 
other values and objectives.252  Thus, it is not surprising that prosecutor 
bias plays a role in shaping the mindset of ICE attorneys.  As described 
in Part II, law enforcement objectives have long been central to the 
immigration agency’s mission, and only intensified in the bureaucratic 
restructuring following 9/11.  Even before the creation of ICE, 
commentators within and outside the INS noted the agency’s tendency 
to focus on enforcement objectives.253  For example, Grover Rees, the 
former general counsel of INS, once acknowledged, “For too many 
INS officials, the answer is easy:  we are the Anti-Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, and we are about keeping people out.”254 
 By defining and continually affirming ICE’s role as centering on 
the prevention of terrorism or other threats to national security, 
government leaders promote prosecutor bias and enforcement 
stringency.255  Forging a conceptual connection between immigration 
                                                 
 252. DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT:  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 22-
25 (2012); Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration:  Prosecutor Bias and the 
Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 306-19 (2013); Bruce A. Green & Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 488 (2009); see, e.g., Charles Perrow, The Disaster after 9/11:  The 
Department of Homeland Security and the Intelligence Reorganization, 2 HOMELAND 
SECURITY AFF. 1 (2006) (“It seems plausible that FEMA’s absorption by the Department of 
Homeland Security, the resulting emphasis on terrorism rather than natural disasters, and the 
inattention to natural disasters by the Bush Administration, account for much of the 
[Hurricane] Katrina and Rita failures.”). 
 253. See, e.g., Scully, supra note 86, at 941 (“[T]he Service’s enforcement function has 
generally overshadowed its adjudications function. . . .  [E]very applicant must be seen as 
suspect.”); Daniel W. Sutherland, The Federal Immigration Bureaucracy:  The Achilles Heel 
of Immigration Reform, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 109, 119 (1996) (describing the “law 
enforcement mentality adopted throughout the agency”); see also Rabin, supra note 13, at 
213 (discussing the agency’s focus on law enforcement). 
 254. Grover Joseph Rees, III, Advice for the New INS Commissioner, 70 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1533, 1534 (1993). 
 255. See JOHN MUELLER & MARK G. STEWART, TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY 6, 14-
17 (2011); Developments in the Law—Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, supra 
note 22, at 1656; see also Perrow, supra note 252, at 15-17 (explaining how bringing disparate 
agencies under DHS’s umbrella led to the displacement of their prior non-security missions); 
David A. Martin, Immigration Policy and the Homeland Security Act Reorganization:  An 
Early Agenda for Practical Improvements, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 2003), http://www. 
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enforcement and national security, whether justified or not, also serves 
to entrench public expectations about the agency’s mission.256  This can 
create a “policy feedback” loop as the government’s initial statements 
and actions create a narrative about what a policy is intended to 
achieve, which in turn generates expectations that the agency will 
fulfill that narrative.257  Indeed, given the pervasive conceptual links 
between immigration law, crime, and terrorism, the development of 
“tunnel vision” among ICE attorneys may be even more pronounced 
than it is among criminal prosecutors,258 especially those prosecutors 
who regularly appear in diversion or problem-solving courts. 
 There is also another force that cultivates prosecutorial bias.  To 
the extent that quantifiable metrics for measuring the achievement of 
agency objectives are available, both managers and ground-level 
officials will tend to orient their work towards fulfillment of those 
measurable goals.259  Removal numbers—especially with respect to 
noncitizens with any criminal history—have proven to be critical 
tokens in the immigration debate as the Obama Administration, like 
administrations before it, strives to promote its image of effectiveness 
with lawmakers and the public. 260   Indeed, ICE under President 
Obama’s leadership has removed more noncitizens than any other 
administration in history.261 
                                                                                                             
migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-policy-and-homeland-security-act-reorganization-
early-agenda-practical (discussing the duties of INS being transferred to DHS under the 
Homeland Security Act). 
 256. See, e.g., M. Isabel Medina, Immigrants and the Government’s War on Terrorism, 
6 NEW CENTENNIAL REV. 225, 230 (2006) (“[T]he reorganization’s symbolic message to 
American society and the world at large was that immigration was inextricably intertwined 
with terrorism.”). 
 257. Cuéllar, supra note 82, at 57-58. 
 258. See SIMON, supra note 252, at 22-25 (explaining the prevalence of tunnel vision 
among prosecutors and other law enforcement officers); Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 
252, at 488 (explaining that prosecutors may be prone to view evidence “through the lens of 
. . . preexisting expectations and conclusions”); see also Developments in the Law—
Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, supra note 22, at 1655 (suggesting that the 
segregation of immigration benefits and removal operations in 2003 may have aggravated 
“the enforcement regime’s propensity for overreach by limiting enforcement officers’ 
interaction with professionals whose duties would have led them to understand and learn 
about immigration enforcement through a humanitarian lens” (footnotes omitted) (citing Jody 
Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
1131, 1184 (2012)). 
 259. WILSON, supra note 248, at 159-71. 
 260. Rabin, supra note 13. 
 261. See Barack Obama, Deporter-in-Chief, ECONOMIST (Feb. 8, 2014), http://www. 
economist.com/node/21595902/ (“America is expelling illegal immigrants at nine times the 
rate of 20 years ago; nearly [two million] so far under Barack Obama, easily outpacing any 
previous president.” (citations omitted)).  The magnitude of the current rate of deportations is 
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 Further, the composition of an organization’s leadership and 
employees significantly shapes its culture and its approach to 
balancing competing interests.  As Rachel Barkow has observed, 
“leadership and personnel decisions can . . . help to foster a self-
perpetuating culture that will be particularly powerful if it feeds into 
the political dynamics that support the agency’s dominant mission.”262  
It is telling, in this regard, that persons with significant law 
enforcement or military experience hold nearly every top- and mid-
level leadership position in ICE.263  The law enforcement perspective of 
the agency’s leaders thus aligns powerfully with the political 
economies that initially led Congress to displace the INS in order to 
create an agency better equipped to protect the country.264  In such an 
environment, it may fairly be expected that many rank-and-file ICE 
prosecutors will view every immigration case they handle through the 
lens of national security. 
 If the agency’s hawkish culture contributes to ICE attorneys’ 
failure to seek justice in individual cases, should the culture be altered?  
Perhaps DHS could systematically emphasize ICE’s concurrent 
commitment to the humanitarian and benefits functions of the 
immigration system through leadership changes, focused training 
sessions, public statements, and so forth.  But this approach is unlikely 
to gain traction.  Rolling back law enforcement rhetoric offers little 
political gain, while exposing agency leaders to critiques and reprisals.  
Moreover, effectuating systemic and lasting change in an agency’s 
                                                                                                             
best appreciated by observing that from 1892 to 2007, the U.S. government deported about 
two million individuals in total—a figure that has been doubled in the past seven years.  Elise 
Foley, Obama Deportation Toll Could Pass 2 Million at Current Rates, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Jan. 31, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/31/obama-deportation_n_ 
2594012.html.  Although the Obama Administration touts increased removals of “criminal 
aliens,” that classification is contestable.  Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More 
Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, Records Show, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), http://nytimes. 
com/2014/04/07/us/more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows.html. 
 262. Barkow, supra note 252, at 312. 
 263. According to the biographies posted on ICE’s public website, the vast majority of 
the top- and mid-level leadership positions in recent years have been occupied by persons 
with significant law enforcement backgrounds.  See ICE Leadership, ICE, http://www.ice. 
gov/leadership (last visited Oct. 24, 2014); National Security Investigations Division, ICE, 
http://www.ice.gov/national-security-investigations-division (last visited Oct. 24, 2014); 
Overview, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/about (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). 
 264. A former trial attorney confided to researchers conducting the first Chicago 
Appleseed study of immigration courts his view that after 9/11, the agency’s objective that its 
prosecutors “see that justice is served” was replaced by a “zero-tolerance” mindset.  
Assembly Line Injustice:  Blueprint To Reform America’s Immigration Courts, supra note 
207, at 17. 
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culture is exceedingly difficult.265  Finally, as the next Subpart suggests, 
prosecutor bias is likely not the only relevant factor here.  The 
tendency toward an across-the-board mindset for the handling of cases 
is reinforced by the work burdens that ICE lawyers carry. 
B. Workload 
 There is no doubt that ICE prosecutors face daunting workloads.  
In 2005, around 579 ICE attorneys were responsible for over 184,000 
pending cases.266  By ICE’s own calculations, this caseload left trial 
attorneys only about twenty minutes to prepare each case.267  Today, the 
ratio of prosecutors to workload is even worse, with just 505 onboard 
trial attorneys handling an average of more than 350 cases each year.268  
The current backlog stands at 396,552 pending removal cases—more 
than double what it was in 2005.269  As ICE’s Principal Legal Advisor 
reported in 2009, “the universal feeling” among assistant chief 
counsels nationwide is that “they are woefully unprepared for 
immigration hearings due to the extremely large amount of individual 
cases they are required to cover.”270 
 Limited time to review and prepare cases has predictable 
consequences.  Prosecutors decline to assess carefully whether 
favorable discretion is warranted in individual cases because they 
come to handle cases in an assembly-line, if not triage, mode.  This 
same problem has received substantial scrutiny in criminal law 
scholarship, especially with respect to our nation’s swollen 
                                                 
 265. See Barkow, supra note 252; Edward Rubin, The Myth of Non-Bureaucratic 
Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY:  DESIGNS, 
DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 52, 61 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006) (“[N]either individual 
nor institutional behavior can be readily altered by simple government ukase.”). 
 266. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-206, DHS IMMIGRATION 
ATTORNEYS:  WORKLOAD ANALYSIS AND WORKFORCE PLANNING EFFORTS LACK DATA AND 
DOCUMENTATION 10 (2007) (indicating that as of September 30, 2006, DHS employed 579 
ICE attorneys in 51 field offices throughout the United States, headed by a Director with 
assistance from 26 Chief Counsels); Immigration Court Backlog Tool, supra note 153 (noting 
that there were 184,211 cases pending in 2006). 
 267. Assembly Line Injustice:  Blueprint To Reform America’s Immigration Courts, 
supra note 207, at 16 (“According to the ICE Principal Legal Advisor, in 2005 Trial Attorneys 
had only about 20 minutes to prepare each case . . . .” (citing Memorandum from William J. 
Howard to All Office of the Principal Legal Advisor Chief Counsel, supra note 27)). 
 268. Letter from Catrina M. Pavlik-Keenan, FOIA Officer, ICE, to Thomas Striepe, 
Faculty Servs. Librarian, Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law (July 11, 2014) (on file with author); 
Cavendish & Schulman, supra note 97, at 39-40. 
 269. Immigration Court Backlog Tool, supra note 153. 
 270. Legomsky, supra note 71, at 1654 (quoting E-mail from Peter Vincent, Principal 
Legal Advisor, ICE, to author (Aug. 19, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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misdemeanor system.271  When prosecutors have insufficient time to 
carry out what they view as their primary responsibilities, they are less 
likely to find time to complete tasks they deem secondary.272  Sorting 
meritorious cases quickly can be challenging, as the charging 
documents in immigration court often consist primarily of a series of 
conclusory allegations of immigration violations and obtaining reliable 
additional information is costly. 273   One regional ICE supervisor 
reflected on the fact that in the face of an exploding immigration 
docket, he often “feels like we are dodging bullets.”274  In light of ICE’s 
heavy caseloads, it is easy to see why trial attorneys might not have 
time to look closely enough at any particular case to feel confident that 
backing away from all-out prosecution is warranted, except in the 
small percentage of cases where competent counsel or immigration 
judges push hard enough on ICE to gain exceptional treatment.275 
 The problem is highlighted by the work of Michael Lipsky on 
street-level bureaucracies.  As he explained, resource constraints pose 
special difficulties when either of two conditions is present:  (1) the 
number of people processed is only a fraction of the number that could 
be processed or (2) the agency’s obligations call for a higher quality of 
work than it is possible to provide in individual cases.276  The essential 
problem when one of these conditions exists is straightforward:  
demand will rise to devour any increase in the agency’s supply of 
services, whether quantitative or qualitative.  Additional expressway 
lanes bring more drivers to the road.  Teachers whose class size is 
reduced from thirty to twenty-five still must manage disciplinary 
problems and learning experiences in substantially the same way.  Both 
                                                 
 271. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision 
Not To Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2010); Cade, supra note 12, at 1781-85; 
Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 26; King, supra note 47, at 20; Alexandra Natapoff, 
Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2012); Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor 
System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089 (2013); see also LIPSKY, supra note 81, at 5, 27 
(explaining that the work of “street-level bureaucrats” is extremely labor-intensive because 
they determine eligibility for benefits and sanctions through direct, individual interactions 
with large numbers of people). 
 272. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2463, 2471 (2004) (“Prosecutors have personal incentives to reduce their workloads so that 
they can leave work early enough to dine with their families.”); Bowers, supra note 197, at 
1140-41. 
 273. Cf. Bowers, supra note 271, at 1702 (“Prosecutors can proceed with almost 
everything, because all cases look good enough; and they cannot determine what to cast 
aside, because no case looks all that bad.”). 
 274. Cavendish & Schulman, supra note 97, at 40-42 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 275. Id. 
 276. LIPSKY, supra note 81, at 33, 37-38. 
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of these resource complications are present for trial attorneys handling 
immigration cases. 
 Today it is estimated that around eleven million unauthorized 
noncitizens reside in the United States.277  Millions more are lawfully 
present but potentially deportable on the basis of criminal history or 
immigration infractions. 278   So while massive funding increases 
enabled the Obama Administration to remove a record 400,000 
persons in the past year, that is but a tiny fraction of the number that 
could be processed.  While a historical challenge in immigration 
enforcement was identifying and apprehending undocumented 
immigrants, as well as noncitizens lawfully present but potentially 
deportable on the basis of criminal convictions,279 this obstacle is now 
much diminished.  Through a combination of cooperative relationships 
with local and state law enforcement agencies, data-sharing 
technology, and well-resourced programs that enable immigration 
agents to access detention facilities in every jurisdiction, the 
government now has the ability to screen nearly every noncitizen who 
comes into contact with the criminal justice system.280  Additionally, in 
recent years a number of states have passed legislation authorizing or 
requiring local authorities to enforce federal immigration law281—for 
example, by verifying the immigration status of every person who is 
stopped, detained, or arrested.282  These activities of state and local 
authorities, in combination with the significant efforts of what is now 
the federal government’s second largest law enforcement agency, pipe 
                                                 
 277. See Passel & Cohn, supra note 3. 
 278. Id. at 9; see Morawetz, supra note 29. 
 279. Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 613, 615 (2012) (citing numerous authorities); Peter H. Schuck & John 
Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens:  The Pitfalls and Promises of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 367 (1999) (describing the historical “failures” of the immigration system at 
identifying and removing noncitizens convicted of crimes in state and local courts). 
 280. See MARC R. ROSENBLUM & WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R42057, INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:  PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS 
13-17 (2012) (describing ICE programs targeting noncitizens who encounter law 
enforcement); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 
91-96 (2013). 
 281. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-13-6 (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-1051 (2014); GA. 
CODE § 17-5-100(b) (2014); UTAH CODE § 76-9-1001 to -1009 (2014). 
 282. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-1051(B); GA. CODE § 17-5-100; IND. CODE § 5-2-
18.2-4 (2014); S.C. CODE § 17-13-170 (2013); UTAH CODE § 76-9-1003.  Potentially 
deportable arrestees are marked with an immigration detainer, which generally functions to 
ensure that such noncitizens are transferred to immigration custody at the point that they 
otherwise would have been released by law enforcement.  See also Cade, supra note 12, at 
1763-65 (discussing ICE programs to identify noncitizens who have criminal records, making 
them potentially deportable). 
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ever growing numbers of potentially deportable noncitizens into 
immigration court.283 
 From the trial attorney’s point of view, the ready supply line of 
cases from the vast pool of potentially deportable noncitizens means 
that when one case is dismissed, another will always be there to take its 
place.284  Thus, even adding a large number of agency attorneys may 
not go far in changing ICE’s prosecutorial culture.  In practical effect, 
the current supply of potentially deportable noncitizens is 
inexhaustible; thus an increased capacity would simply result in 
“reproducing the level of service quality at a higher volume.”285  At 
best, the active caseload managed by each attorney would remain the 
same, while the inactive load would decrease slightly.286 
 Heavy, intractable caseloads help to explain why some ICE 
prosecutors bring aggressive or uncooperative behavior into the 
handling of cases that go forward.  First, until the hearing is underway, 
the trial attorney may have little idea whether the government’s 
grounds for deportation (or the noncitizen’s grounds for relief) are 
meritorious.287  Trial attorneys thus may seek to compensate for a lack 
of knowledge by maintaining resolve and preserving leverage until an 
approaching hearing date gets the case off the backburner.  Further, 
with insufficient time to prepare for addressing the merits of any 
particular noncitizen’s claim to asylum or other relief, the ICE attorney 
may instead rely on wide-ranging cross-examinations that often come 
to center on the magnification of perceived weaknesses in the 
noncitizen’s testimony or challenges to the noncitizen’s moral 
character.288  Moreover, once courtroom proceedings have begun, the 
instinct to win may take over—no matter how strong the noncitizen’s 
right to remain may appear.289 
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 Finally, the unceasing flow of repetitive cases—especially in 
jurisdictions where immigration fraud is, or is perceived to be, 
common—may desensitize some ICE prosecutors to “the human 
dimensions of the job.”290  One trial attorney with whom I spoke 
relayed that recurrent work on matters involving claims that “everyone 
knows [are] a farce” becomes “soul-sucking.”291  Such experiences 
inevitably dampen any potential desire to sort out appropriate cases for 
the exercise of favorable discretion. 
C. Lessons from Criminal Law 
 It bears repeating that the justice-seeking responsibilities of ICE’s 
prosecutors are embedded in statutes, case law, training materials, and 
policy memoranda.  The pronouncements bespeak a commitment to 
fairness values that the agency’s actions thus far have failed to make a 
reality.  What is more, enforcement bias and heavy workloads are 
features of ICE’s culture that are not easily susceptible to change.  How 
then, can the agency improve the quality of its efforts to foster the 
pursuit of justice by its frontline attorneys? 
 A potentially fruitful point of comparison may be found in the 
administration of criminal law.  Although criminal systems vary 
widely, even within states, all employ a number of procedural 
mechanisms and design features that encourage their prosecutors to 
seek justice, and not just convictions, despite the fact that they too 
must contend with tunnel-vision tendencies and sometimes 
overwhelming caseloads.  If the analogy between immigration removal 
adjudication and the criminal system is apt, some of these features 
might be implemented within ICE to heighten the trial attorneys’ 
accountability and incentives to seek justice. 
 In important respects, the criminal and administrative removal 
systems, and the function of government prosecutors in each, are 
similar—and increasingly so.  The ostensible mission of each is to 
determine, through adversarial proceedings, whether significant 
statutory penalties should be imposed on the basis of past conduct.  In 
both systems, the contest is frequently lopsided, pitting trained govern-
                                                                                                             
‘agin’ it.’”); see also Barkow, supra note 252, at 313 (explaining that the “will-to-win can 
create cognitive biases in even the most well-intentioned prosecutors”); Bibas, supra note 
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ment attorneys wielding the vast power of the state against persons 
who most of the time cannot afford to hire their own lawyers.  And the 
government’s initial charging decisions in both immigration and 
criminal proceedings frequently produce both immediate detention and 
a frame of possible outcomes that shape the adjudicative process in 
fundamental ways.292 
 Immigration and criminal law have also increasingly converged, 
especially since legislation in the 1990s dramatically expanded the 
grounds of detention and removal on the basis of criminal history.293  
Today, the path to a removal hearing frequently begins with some kind 
of contact with law enforcement officials, often at the state or local 
level.294  The administrative removal system is then employed as an 
add-on, or even an alternative, to the criminal prosecution, especially 
for noncitizens arrested for misdemeanors and immigration 
violations.295  Moreover, because so many of these matters are handed 
off to ICE attorneys, they are often the first (and last) government 
lawyers in a position to evaluate the propriety of the noncitizen’s arrest, 
just like criminal prosecutors who handle criminal prosecutions.296 
 Perhaps most saliently, because each system is built around an 
elaborate code that puts many more people in violation of the law than 
either regime can possibly subject to enforcement, both criminal 
prosecutors and immigration trial attorneys inevitably must make 
choices about how, and against whom, the law is applied.  This 
prosecutorial discretion goes largely unchecked by courts—though for 
somewhat different reasons—in each system.  Because only about 5% 
of criminal cases proceed to trial, much of what criminal prosecutors 
do—investigation, charging, and plea negotiating—is subject to little 
review by a judge.297  While criminal judges ultimately must approve 
plea bargains before ordering a judgment of conviction, they have little 
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incentive not to accept the agreement as long as the plea is knowingly 
and voluntarily made.298  Similarly, statutory limitations on judicial 
review of immigration proceedings, as well as institutionally driven 
policies of deference to the Executive Branch in this area, all but 
foreclose judicial checking of discretionary decisions made by ICE 
and its trial attorneys.299 
 Criminal prosecutors are expected to exercise discretion to avoid 
subjecting defendants to unwarranted loss of liberty, harassment, 
anxiety, or stigma.  Their use of discretion is seen as integral to 
achieving justice in the criminal system, and the decision whether to 
prosecute requires “consideration of the individual facts and 
circumstances of each case.”300  Because criminal prosecutors act on 
behalf of a “sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all,” they have a responsibility 
not to simply obtain convictions, but also to do what is right.301 
 Despite the esteem in which criminal prosecutors are held and the 
largely unreviewable freedom they are given, they are not left 
completely to their own devices with respect to the “justice” part of the 
job.  Rather, numerous mechanisms are employed to check prosecu-
torial abuse and error and to reduce power asymmetries between the 
government and the defendants.  Constitutionally driven procedural 
measures include the rights to (1) counsel at the government’s expense 
for indigents, (2) effective assistance of counsel, (3) review of probable 
cause determinations, (4) a public trial, (5) a trial by a jury of peers or 
an impartial judge, (6) the prohibition of double jeopardy, and 
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(7) exoneration if the government does not meet its burden of proof.302  
Other mechanisms have constitutional origins but have also been 
developed and expanded through legislation and administrative policy, 
including the availability of pretrial motions and hearings, speedy trial 
rules, and discovery obligations.303  Still other organizational design 
features, like vertical prosecution arrangements, have been widely 
implemented in prosecutors’ offices as a related policy choice to 
increase accountability and efficiency.304  All of these protections may 
not attach to every kind of prosecution, and there are variations in the 
form of each rule across jurisdictions and types of criminal 
proceedings.  Nor are the features fail-safe:  prosecutorial errors and 
overreaches persist.305  Nevertheless, the administrative mechanisms 
considered here can be usefully generalized and are more or less a part 
of all criminal systems.  Our history is replete with reminders of how 
much more tenuous the criminal system’s hold on justice would be if 
these protective procedures did not check prosecutorial authority.306 
 To be sure, there are significant differences between criminal 
tribunals and immigration courts.  The presumption of a defendant’s 
innocence until guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt helps justify 
heightened procedural safeguards in criminal systems.  In addition, 
criminal sanctions can include lengthy prison sentences (including life 
without parole) and capital punishment.  They also can trigger a host 
of collateral consequences that follow the convicted individual for an 
entire lifetime.307 
 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has long recognized that 
an order of deportation is often more onerous than many penal 
sanctions.308  This is increasingly the case, as tougher immigration laws 
retroactively make lawfully present noncitizens with deep roots in their 
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communities subject to deportation, even on the basis of minor 
convictions that occurred many decades ago.309  And despite the higher 
burden of proof in criminal cases, the real-world operation of the 
criminal justice system often makes it easy for prosecutors to obtain 
guilty pleas simply by piling up charges that the accused must defend 
against.310  It is at trial where most due process criminal procedure 
rights come into play.  Yet most criminal prosecutions do not go to 
trial, 311  so that in practice, the criminal system bears a closer 
resemblance to removal proceedings than might first meet the eye.  In 
short, while there are natural differences between administrative 
removal hearings and criminal prosecutions, they are a great deal alike 
in important respects.312 
 It follows that DHS would do well to consider borrowing certain 
pretrial mechanisms that criminal systems typically use to encourage 
prosecutors to facilitate justice and, more particularly, to counter the 
pressures that prosecutor bias and case overload bring to bear in the 
criminal justice system.  In the remainder of this Article, I focus on 
four such measures that the Executive Branch might adopt without the 
need for additional legislation:  discovery obligations, vertical 
prosecution, enhanced declination power, and prehearing conferences.  
These procedures would work together to increase prosecutorial 
accountability and encourage earlier screening of cases for merit and 
possible exercises of equitable discretion, while reducing the 
asymmetries that can produce inaccurate or unjust results, particularly 
when ICE attorneys employ hardball tactics. 
 I offer two overarching observations before proceeding to my 
proposals for reform.  First, the most direct route to a more humane 
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and efficient enforcement system would involve changes to the 
substantive immigration laws that define grounds of inadmissibility, 
deportability, and eligibility for relief.  Rolling back some of the more 
punitive statutory measures enacted in the mid-1990s would greatly 
reduce, though not eliminate, the current need for increased 
prosecutorial discretion in immigration enforcement. 
 But such reforms are not at all likely to take hold.  Most 
politicians see little benefit in enacting laws that make it easier for 
noncitizens to avoid removal.  The year 2013 witnessed an epic 
struggle to pass a wide-ranging immigration bill.313  It was the fifth 
failed comprehensive reform effort of the past decade.  Once again, the 
breadth of division between opposing camps, the depth of passions on 
immigration issues, and the intensity of public scrutiny stood in the 
way of change.  At this point, it is safe to assume that any legislation 
surviving in 2014 will not reduce the code’s expansive, harsh removal 
grounds.  Instead, if enactment of a legalization program for some 
portion of the eleven million undocumented persons in this country 
occurs, it is likely to come with a trade-off for strengthened 
enforcement measures, both at the border and in the strictness of 
substantive criteria for admission and removal.  Similarly, although the 
right to counsel is arguably the most important procedural measure to 
equalize power and achieve justice,314 it is also the most expensive 
measure to implement and would likely require congressional action to 
be successful nationwide.315  In addition to the financial barriers to the 
establishment of a general or limited right to appointed counsel in 
                                                 
 313. Rebecca Kaplan, Can Immigration Reform Pass in 2014?, CBS NEWS (Dec. 26, 
2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/can-immigration-reform-pass-in-2014/. 
 314. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Valazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543-45 (2001) (emphasizing 
the role of attorneys in the administration of justice); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 
(1972) (“The assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial.”).  
For recent arguments in favor of at least a limited right to counsel in immigration court, see 
Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents, 122 YALE L.J. 
2394 (2013); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299 
(2011); Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation:  The Right to Appointed 
Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 63 (2012); and Beth J. Werlin, Renewing the Call:  Immigrants’ Right to 
Appointed Counsel in Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 393 (2000). 
 315. In 2014, New York City launched the nation’s first indigent immigrant defender 
system, training 25 law graduates to provide representation to 135 individuals, funded by a 
$500,000 grant from the Robin Hood Foundation. See Kirk Semple, Seeking Better Legal 
Help for Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/ 
nyregion/service-program-will-recruit-law-school-graduates-to-help-represent-immi 
grants.html?_r=0; Kirk Semple, City To Help Immigrants Seeking Deportation Reprieves, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2013), http://nytimes.com/2013/07/18/nyregion/city-to-help-immigrants- 
seeking-deportation-reprieves.html. 
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immigration proceedings, other significant systemic barriers to 
ensuring that such representation will be effective will likely persist 
and may require additional legal reform.316  The recognition, funding, 
and implementation of a broad right to counsel in immigration court 
thus faces substantial obstacles. 
 The second point to observe is that one need not necessarily look 
to the criminal system, or frame the problem in terms of prosecutors’ 
duty to seek justice, to conclude that the existing removal system is in 
need of change.317  Regardless of how our criminal system works, when 
trial attorneys litigate in ways that fail to live up to their responsibility 
to see that justice is done, the values of accuracy,318 consistency,319 
efficiency, 320  and fairness 321 —all fundamental objectives of any 
administrative adjudicative system—are compromised.  These values 
are interrelated and connected with other values, as well.  For example, 
the promotion of correct (and uniform) outcomes promotes the 
                                                 
 316. See Keyes, supra note 196 (discussing the persistent culture of poor defense of 
immigrants in removal proceedings and the significant institutional pressures hampering 
zealous advocacy); Stephen H. Legomsky, Transporting Padilla to Deportation Proceedings:  
A Due Process Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 43, 
47 (2011) (discussing how the current administrative case law gives adjudicators no 
constraints in evaluating effectiveness). 
 317. For example, as Geoff Heeren demonstrates, in the last half century many 
administrative courts have embraced “liberal discovery processes similar to those in civil 
litigation.”  Heeren, supra note 13, at 1617; see also id. at 1577-78 & n.56 (citing examples of 
many administrative agencies that have adopted formal discovery rules that are broader than 
those provided in immigration court). 
 318. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS, supra note 248, at 103-04; Edward K. Cheng, Changing 
Scientific Evidence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 315, 322 (2003); Robert Pauw, Judicial Review of 
“Pattern and Practice” Cases:  What To Do When the INS Acts Unlawfully, 70 WASH. L. REV. 
779, 793 (1995) (explaining that both factual and legal determinations should be correct). 
 319. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS, supra note 248, at 103-04 (explaining that although error 
is unavoidable and, therefore, tolerable within limits, agencies are expected to strive to pursue 
outcomes that align with the relevant criteria and rules in a given factual situation). 
 320. Pauw, supra note 318, at 791 (explaining that efficiency goals include minimizing 
costs to parties and the government (which are passed on to taxpayers), as well as reducing 
waiting times for a decision). 
 321. See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders:  A Necessary Step 
Toward Immigration Law Reform, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 203, 262-63 (2002); Roger C. Cramton, 
Administrative Procedure Reform:  The Effects of S. 1663 on the Conduct of Federal Rate 
Proceedings, 16 ADMIN. L. REV. 108, 111-12 (1963); Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices 
for the Review of Agency Adjudication:  A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. 
REV. 1297, 1313 (1986); Pauw, supra note 318, at 796; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing 
Secrets:  Examining Deferred Action and Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U. N.H. L. 
REV. 1, 57 (2012) (describing the author’s efforts to obtain data on individual deferred action 
grants by various DHS subagencies and arguing that lack of transparency about the criteria 
for deferred action leads to unequal access, inconsistent results, and inefficiencies). 
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perception of fairness, public respect for governing legal institutions, 
and judicial confidence in the agency’s representations and positions.322 
 The pursuit of these values might seem to warrant judicial 
intervention to promote more due process in removal proceedings.  
Judges, however, have a distinctly limited capacity to inject fairness 
into immigration court.  In general, judicial review is a sluggish form 
of challenging agency action.323   More particularly, Congress has 
exempted removal hearings from the Administrative Procedure Act.324  
While Fifth Amendment due process does apply, our traditions do not 
provide courts with much room to maneuver in overlaying 
constitutional protections on the immigration system.325  If anything, 
judicial inclinations to impede deportations through procedural 
protections may have diminished in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.326  
The bottom line is that if change is going to occur in how DHS 
processes deportation cases, it is most likely to come from within the 
agency.327 
V. MODEST AGENCY REFORMS 
 Reforming the immigration adjudication system without 
congressional legislation must focus on achievable goals.  In this Part, 
I propose four modest reforms that borrow directly from already-
existing practice in the criminal law field.  These measures, which 
DHS or the Attorney General could readily implement, would not 
drastically affect the agency’s enforcement culture.  They would, 
however, increase the accountability of trial attorneys and incentivize 
them to screen cases at an early stage, thus raising the likelihood that 
they would (1) exercise discretion more carefully and consistently and 
(2) focus limited resources on the most important targets for removal.  
Many trial attorneys will continue to litigate removal cases as they do 
now, even if agency leaders bolster their already-declared commitment 
                                                 
 322. Green, supra note 101, at 271-73. 
 323. Rubin, supra note 265, at 75. 
 324. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND 
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 654, 662-64 (5th ed. 2009). 
 325. Legomsky, supra note 316; Motomura, supra note 299. 
 326. See Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim:  Judicial Deference to Congressional 
Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 343 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005). 
 327. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 248, at 15 (“[T]he task of 
improving the quality of administrative justice is one that must be carried forward primarily 
by administrators.”); Cade, supra note 11 (arguing that in the absence of an effective judicial 
exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings, ICE prosecutors should administratively 
suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment); Rubin, supra note 265, at 
75-77. 
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to promoting justice in the adjudicative process.  Even so, a reduction 
of informational disparities, along with increased prehearing 
communication, will diminish the likelihood that hardball tactics will 
lead to inaccurate and disproportionate results.  While the measures 
considered here would not replace the benefits of an indigent right to 
counsel in immigration court or a rollback of excessively punitive 
immigration laws, they are realistic possibilities that could be 
implemented in the near future without the congressional intervention 
that more far-reaching reforms would require. 
A. Discovery Obligations 
 While ICE has access to vast data stores that it can use against 
noncitizens in removal proceedings, noncitizens must initiate and wait 
on the results of formal FOIA requests, even to obtain documents in 
the government’s A-file that directly concern them.  This form of 
discovery is cumbersome and inefficient even when successful and is 
all but unavailable to those who proceed pro se or while in detention.  
Although a variety of discovery innovations may warrant 
consideration,328 the most critical reform would require trial attorneys 
to turn over contents of the noncitizen’s A-file (excepting confidential 
information) upon request or at the first master calendar hearing in 
every case where the noncitizen intends to contest removability, seek 
relief, or obtain the assistance of counsel. 
 In criminal proceedings, discovery rules oblige prosecutors to 
give defendants access to a variety of information.  To be sure, the 
criminal defendant’s baseline right of access to material exculpatory 
evidence within the government’s possession is grounded in the 
Constitution.329  But the disclosure rules in every federal and state 
jurisdiction are significantly shaped by a combination of statutes, 
professional responsibility rules, common law doctrines, and 
administrative policies.330  While subject to significant variation with 
                                                 
 328. See Heeren, supra note 13, at 1617-27 (evaluating a range of discovery 
measures). 
 329. See 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.3(a) (3d ed. 2007) 
(discussing the constitutional sources of a defendant’s right of access to evidence); Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 330. See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 329, § 20.2(a)-(b) (discussing the statutory and 
court rules governing discovery); 6 id. § 24.3(a) (“Various statutes, common law rules, and 
constitutional commands combine to shape the capacity of the defense to gain access to 
evidence it might use at trial.”); see also 5 id. § 20.1(c) (describing how both the federal 
system and the states have “uniformly” expanded defense discovery). 
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respect to the timing and content of disclosure obligations, the rules in 
all jurisdictions exceed the constitutional minimum.331 
 In the federal system, Rule 16 mandates disclosure of a broad 
range of material, including the defendant’s written and recorded 
statements, the substance of oral statements, reports of physical and 
medical examinations, and other relevant documents.332  Some federal 
district courts have implemented local rules that exceed the scope of 
Rule 16,333 and DOJ’s internal guidelines instruct U.S. attorneys that 
“[p]roviding broad and early discovery often promotes the truth-
seeking mission of the Department and fosters a speedy resolution of 
many cases.”334  In particular, “[e]xculpatory information . . . must be 
disclosed to the defendant reasonably promptly after discovery.”335 
 Many states’ discovery rules in criminal cases go even further 
than the federal rule.  The ABA has long recommended liberal defense 
access to prosecutors’ files, in recognition of the possibility of 
prosecutorial abuse and the inherent difficulty and subjectivity of 
identifying relevant or even material evidence.336  In accordance with 
various iterations of the ABA guidelines, a small but growing number 
of jurisdictions have mandated “open-file discovery,” or something 
close to it, thereby giving defense attorneys substantial access to 
prosecutorial and law enforcement files involved in investigating or 
prosecuting the defendant.337  Over thirty other states stop short of 
open-file discovery while still providing for broader disclosure 
obligations than the federal rule.338 
 Discovery rules that give defendants access to evidence in the 
government’s possession help ensure that prosecutors do not prioritize 
winning cases over achieving justice by capitalizing on information 
and power asymmetries.  Implementing, at a minimum, a universal A-
                                                 
 331. See 5 id. § 20.2(c) (discussing variations in the operation of discovery 
provisions). 
 332. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 329, § 20.1(c). 
 333. See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 329, § 20.2(b). 
 334. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., DOJ, to Department 
Prosecutors, DOJ, DOJ (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/ 
usam/title9/crm00165.htm. 
 335. Id.  But see United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628-29 (2002) (failing to turn 
over impeachment material to a defendant does not invalidate a guilty plea).  It has never been 
squarely decided whether exculpatory evidence need be turned over preplea in federal 
criminal proceedings, because so far no one seems to have challenged a United States 
Attorney’s decision to withhold that material. 
 336. See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 329, § 20.1(c). 
 337. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-902 to -910 (2013); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16; 
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220; MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9; N.J. R. CRIM. P. 3:12-2, 3:13-3. 
 338. See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 329, § 20.2(b) nn.32-33. 
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file disclosure rule in immigration court would thus further justice-
seeking goals in several respects.  First, more accessible discovery 
would give noncitizens access to critical documents bearing on their 
ability to rebut the governments’ charges of deportability or to 
establish eligibility for discretionary relief from the immigration judge.  
The importance of providing access to applications and documents 
previously filed by, or on behalf of, a noncitizen now facing removal is 
well illustrated by the Dent litigation. 
 Second, increased discovery would also improve the removal 
system’s administration of justice in a related but distinct way.  The 
current lack of discovery in immigration court contributes to the 
system’s inefficiencies because it elevates the unpredictability of 
merits hearings.  The inability to access evidence held by the 
government exacerbates, for example, the Hobson’s choice created by 
one-time-only, last-minute discretionary offers of administrative 
closure in cases where noncitizens may be eligible for more significant 
adjudicative relief.  With better access to evidence the government 
intends to introduce at a merits hearing, noncitizens could make more 
informed choices about whether to accept administrative closure (or 
voluntary departure) in lieu of proceeding to a hearing, thus saving the 
government considerable resources. 
 Third, further-reaching disclosure obligations would have the 
likely effect of requiring trial attorneys to take a look at cases earlier in 
the process than they currently do.  This may not be true if ICE 
mechanically serves the entire A-file, but presumably trial attorneys 
would first screen the file for information implicating national security 
concerns before turning over any material.  In low-priority cases with 
strong equities, earlier review might encourage trial attorneys to 
narrow issues or exercise prosecutorial discretion; in high-priority 
cases, an earlier look might lead them to be proactive in developing 
further evidence against the noncitizen. 
 Finally, mandating disclosure obligations would reduce the 
chance that a noncitizen with a valid claim to stay is deported on the 
basis of the government’s ability to create the appearance of 
inconsistencies through surprise cross-examinations.  In immigration 
proceedings, “[s]urprising the applicant in court with her past 
inconsistent statements is the government’s one tried and true means of 
challenging . . . credibility.”339  Yet preventing unfair surprise is a 
central reason that more liberal discovery rules were adopted in the 
                                                 
 339. Heeren, supra note 13, at 1615. 
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criminal system,340 as well as in civil litigation contexts.341  In the words 
of Justice Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court, “The truth 
is most likely to emerge when each side seeks to take the other by 
reason rather than by surprise.”342 
 It is true that noncitizens with better information may gain an 
opportunity to clarify past statements and avoid inconsistencies in 
court.  But that is the case in all proceedings with discovery 
procedures.343  Despite the presence of significant stakes in criminal 
proceedings, which opponents of liberalized discovery argued elevate 
the defendant’s incentive to commit perjury, the viewpoint that 
prosecutions should be “less a game of blindman’s [bluff] and more a 
fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest 
practicable extent” carried the day.344  There is reason to believe that 
trial attorneys currently overrely on wide-ranging cross-examination 
based on informational advantages.345  If so, the system as a whole will 
benefit if they engage with the merits more directly. 
 Enhanced disclosure rules should not inhibit ICE’s ability to 
obtain removal orders for those persons who lack eligibility to remain 
in the United States or who otherwise compromise important public 
interests.  Federal statutes already exempt national security or 
confidential information from ICE’s disclosure obligations.346  And 
much of the information in the A-file is gathered, in the first place, 
through disclosures made by the respondent from whom the 
information is later held back.347 
 The optimal scope and timing of discovery in immigration court 
likely lies somewhere between Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 
and open-file discovery.  At a minimum, however, noncitizens in 
removal proceedings should be provided with the full contents of their 
A-file (excluding sensitive or confidential information) upon request 
or at the first master calendar hearing, unless they elect not to seek the 
assistance of counsel, contest removability, or request relief from 
                                                 
 340. 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 329, §  20.1(b). 
 341. Heeren, supra note 13, at 1573-74. 
 342. Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 228, 249 (1964). 
 343. Heeren, supra note 13, at 1577-79 (citing to a variety of administrative 
proceedings with formal discovery rules). 
 344. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). 
 345. Heeren, supra note 13. 
 346. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2012) (stating that a noncitizen is not entitled to 
examine national security information); id. § 1229a(c)(2) (stating that a noncitizen is not 
entitled to have access to records or documents deemed to be confidential). 
 347. Heeren, supra note 13. 
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removal.  The opportunity to examine the contents of the A-file early 
in the proceedings would significantly aid immigration attorneys in 
advising noncitizens as to the appropriate course of action, 
contributing in many cases to a more efficient proceeding. 
 There remains the question of which agency is the right one to 
implement discovery-related reforms.  As the DOJ has done for United 
States attorneys, the DHS could use its supervisory powers to 
implement broader disclosure rules for ICE trial attorneys.348  However, 
if discovery is primarily a matter of DHS policy, the rules will be 
harder to enforce and will likely be exercised inconsistently.  
Accordingly, discovery obligations in immigration court are most 
likely to be successful if implemented through rule making by the 
Attorney General, so that immigration judges have authority and 
control over the process.  Formal rule making will also give interested 
stakeholders an opportunity to weigh in on the scope of discovery 
obligations in immigration court, as a range of possibilities are 
reasonable (for example, whether noncitizens should have access to 
other material in the government’s possession that is related to their 
cases but not contained in their A-files).  The bottom line is that 
measures requiring ICE attorneys, early in the life of a removal case, to 
review and turn over any nonconfidential documents in their 
possession that bear on an individual’s claims of a right to remain will 
heighten the likelihood of a just and efficient outcome. 
B. Vertical Prosecution 
 Trial attorneys are not assigned to individual cases.  Instead, they 
typically rotate through the immigration judges’ dockets by date and 
become responsible for cases only shortly before merits hearings are 
scheduled to take place.349  This arrangement contrasts with the model 
employed in many criminal prosecutors’ offices and other civil 
enforcement bureaus, where “vertical prosecution” ensures that one 
attorney (or a small team) is assigned to handle all aspects of a case 
from its arrival in the office to its resolution.350 
                                                 
 348. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., DOJ, to All United 
States Attorneys, DOJ, DOJ (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/dag/memorandum-heads-
department-litigating-components-handling-criminal-matters-all-united-states. 
 349. Cavendish & Schulman, supra note 97, at 44-45; Assembly Line Injustice:  
Blueprint To Reform America’s Immigration Courts, supra note 207, at 18; see ICE, OFFICE 
PROCEDURES MANUAL 24 (July 2, 2009) (noting that trial attorney assignments for individual 
merits hearings are made one month beforehand) (on file with author). 
 350. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 304, at 1141 (describing different types of vertical 
prosecution arrangements). 
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 A lack of vertical prosecution in immigration court interferes 
with the trial attorney’s capacity to exercise careful discretion for 
several reasons.  When no prosecutor is assigned to a case, noncitizens 
and their counsel are without a meaningful point of contact with whom 
to communicate or negotiate.  Thus, even if a noncitizen has a clear 
right to remain in the country or presents significant equities 
warranting prosecutorial leniency or adjudicative discretion, there may 
be little chance of communicating these factors effectively until the 
case has trudged all the way through the long journey to a final 
hearing.  Nor is the limited interaction with the prosecutor at the 
court’s master calendar hearings sufficient.  Master calendars typically 
are crowded, all-day affairs with scores of cases to schedule.  
Moreover, as a practical matter, the trial attorney relies on a cart full of 
unfamiliar A-files to gain only an initial sense of the government’s 
allegations and evidence as each case is called by the judge.  ICE 
attorneys also have important specialized work to do at master 
calendar proceedings.  They must, for example, present the 
government’s position in uncontested cases and request in absentia 
removal orders against respondents who fail to show up.351 
 Additionally, when trial attorneys do not have ownership over the 
cases on the court’s calendar, they have an incentive to pass the buck 
along and let someone else consider discretion further down the line.352  
In a horizontal model, attorneys do not internalize (or perhaps even 
notice) the consequences for individuals whose cases should have been 
screened and dropped or negotiated at an earlier stage.  On the other 
side of the coin, when attorneys are not accountable for cases from 
filing (or soon after) to adjudication, they may not fully develop 
evidence in the higher priority cases that should have been pursued 
most vigorously.  Finally, a system of vertical prosecution will increase 
transparency and accountability with respect to implementation of the 
discovery reforms proposed in the previous Subpart. 
 For these reasons, ICE should implement vertical prosecution in 
every removal case.  Indeed, assignments could be made even before 
the NTA is filed with the court, so that the trial attorney who will be 
prosecuting the matter has ownership and control over whether the 
charges are accurate or whether removal should be pursued at all.  
                                                 
 351. See discussion supra Part II.B (explaining master calendar hearings). 
 352. Cf. Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1157, 1181 (2004) (“In the lower-level court in which I practice, the 
prosecutors very rarely appear on their own cases.  They read from a note in the file, have no 
personal knowledge about the case in front of them and precious little discretion.”). 
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Although in some field offices ICE attorneys are given the 
responsibility to review some NTAs before filing, such occurrences 
are not mandated by any agency-wide policies and occur only 
sporadically.  Moreover, an ICE attorney might approach the review of 
an NTA that he or she likely will be responsible for prosecuting more 
carefully than one to be handled by others. 
 Program administrators may raise questions about whether 
prefiling assignments make sense, however.  They might emphasize 
that many noncitizens choose not to contest their proceedings and 
simply consent to being removed right away, thus reducing the need for 
vertical integration.  Furthermore, some agency supervisors have 
argued that resource limitations preclude assigning one attorney to 
each case in light of inevitable scheduling conflicts. 353   These 
objections should be taken seriously but are not deal breakers for the 
need for vertical prosecution. 
 First, in many hearing locations there are only a few sitting 
immigration judges, obviating or at least reducing scheduling 
difficulties.354  Moreover, even in the busier jurisdictions, each trial 
attorney could be assigned to a particular immigration judge’s docket 
as a routine matter.  That way, when a case is filed in immigration 
court it would be assigned to both prosecutor and judge at the same 
time, so that scheduling conflicts would be minimized.  To further 
increase efficiency, judge-prosecutor assignments could be made 
provisional until the noncitizen’s first master calendar appearance.  
This would allow maximum flexibility in the event the respondent 
chooses not to contest removal. 
 When a government attorney becomes part of a working group 
with a particular judge, there is some risk that the judge will over time 
tend to defer to, rather than second-guess, a de facto working partner.355  
                                                 
 353. Cavendish & Schulman, supra note 97, at 45. 
 354. EOIR Immigration Court Listing, supra note 154. 
 355. See, e.g., JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE:  AN 
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 27-28, 32-34 (1977) (explaining that 
working groups strive to maintain cohesion and reduce conflict within the courtroom); 
HENRY R. GLICK, COURTS, POLITICS, AND JUSTICE 234 (3d ed. 1993) (contending that the 
dynamics of courtroom working groups encourage plea bargain settlements); Eric Lane, Due 
Process and Problem-Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 955, 966 (2003) (“In a setting in 
which the defense counsel . . . , the prosecutor, and the judge are all ‘regulars,’ in that they 
work together daily in the same courtroom, they develop shared goals, attitudes, and rules of 
conduct that allow the system to work . . . .”); Doris Marie Provine, Too Many Black Men:  
The Sentencing Judge’s Dilemma, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 823, 829 (1998) 
(“Accommodation to each other’s priorities is the rule, however, not just because of the 
payoffs it offers, but because the work group comes to share professional values and 
experiences.”).  Additionally, vertical schemes can produce inconsistencies between 
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This concern might give pause when regularly assigning trial attorneys 
to particular immigration judges’ dockets.  But in fact, similar 
relationships already exist between trial attorneys and immigration 
judges in many immigration courts, in light of the frequency of their 
contact, their shared government employment, and the fact that a 
majority of immigration judges take the bench after serving as trial 
attorneys.356  This is not to suggest impropriety, but rather to observe 
that—as in many courts—working relationships between regular 
participants already are a norm in immigration court.357  Moreover, 
even if some danger of undue prosecutorial “capture” exists, it is likely 
outweighed by gains in accountability, efficiency, and depth of 
knowledge that vertical arrangements present.358 
 Recently, a few but growing number of chief counsel offices have 
experimented with “unit prosecution,” assigning each case to a team of 
attorneys.359  In anonymous interviews, trial attorneys I spoke with 
from two such offices reported that the change has increased pretrial 
communication between noncitizens and ICE, particularly with respect 
to requests for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.360  Both also 
reported that the measure had reduced, to some extent, the incentive to 
pass the buck.361  Although it is early to assess the gains of experiments 
in team-based prosecution, these initial reports provide a promising 
                                                                                                             
prosecutors, particularly if there ends up being a prosecutor-judge alliance in the courtroom.  
See also Levine, supra note 304, at 1141 (discussing the pros and cons of vertical prosecution 
arrangements).  Each immigration court may have a consistent internal approach, but one that 
differs from other jurisdictions. 
 356. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 185. 
 357. See, e.g., STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 30 (2012) 
(discussing working groups among criminal prosecutors, judges and defense attorneys). 
 358. Cf. Lane, supra note 355, at 958, 962-67, 974-78 (acknowledging the problem of 
threats to judicial neutrality in problem-solving courts, but concluding they compare 
favorably to traditional courts and will be successful with sufficient attention to procedural 
precautions).  Of course, immigration courts are very different from problem-solving courts, 
in that the latter forum’s prosecutor is no longer trying to convict or punish and the judge’s 
range of outcomes may be more flexible. 
 359. See SAN ANTONIO OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, ICE, supra note 107, at 17-21 
(describing unit prosecution in the San Antonio office); Cavendish & Schulman, supra note 
97, at 45 (indicating that offices implementing unit prosecution include Los Angeles, 
Chicago, San Antonio, and San Francisco). 
 360. See Interview with ICE Trial Attorney in Large Urban Office, supra note 79; 
Interview with ICE Trial Attorney in Small Midwestern Office, supra note 76 (framed in 
terms of “accountability”); see also id. (stating that unit prosecution was really just a 
formalization of an already existing de facto policy, due to the small size of her office). 
 361. Interview with ICE Trial Attorney in Large Urban Office, supra note 79; 
Interview with ICE Trial Attorney in Small Midwestern Office, supra note 76 (pointing out 
that prosecutorial discretion requests were the only instances where she believed the shift to 
formal unit prosecution was making a difference). 
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signal.  However, even where unit prosecution has been implemented, 
teams are not typically assigned until an individual merits hearing is 
scheduled, defeating some of the gains that could be realized through 
earlier assignments.362 
 Vertical prosecution could be implemented as a matter of DHS 
policy without any agency rule making and at relatively little 
additional expense to the government.  In fact, vertical integration will 
produce efficiencies by reducing inefficiency-generating handoffs, 
even if some problematic staffing complications result.  Most 
important, vertical staffing holds the potential of heightening 
individualized assessment by, and communication with, ICE attorneys 
as they process cases.  And if such assessment and communication 
occur, the opportunities for achieving justice in removal proceedings 
will be enhanced. 
C. Increased Responsibility and Authority for Screening and 
Declining Cases 
 The discretionary right of prosecutors not to pursue a criminal 
prosecution has long been recognized.363  The initial decision to decline 
prosecution is the most protected from scrutiny.  This makes sense 
because prosecutors are likely to be better positioned than other actors 
in the criminal justice system to determine whether a particular 
prosecution that they will be responsible for prosecuting is warranted, 
according to the magnitude of the offense, the community’s norms, the 
strength of the evidence, the available resources, the wishes of the 
victim, and other factors. 
 In many cases, ICE trial attorneys do not have the opportunity to 
exercise independent judgment about whether to file removal 
proceedings in cases that they will be responsible for litigating.364  
Other government officers and agencies share the authority to 
commence removal proceedings, and no rule or agency practice 
requires or even regularly facilitates the review of an NTA by any 
attorney before it is filed with the immigration court.  And, as the BIA 
has interpreted agency regulations, trial attorneys are divested of the 
                                                 
 362. See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, ICE, supra note 107, at 
18-21 (explaining that the trial attorney “present at the last master calendar where an IC 
merits hearing is set will inherit the case to completion” unless there is a conflict, in which 
case another attorney in the unit will handle the case). 
 363. Reiss, supra note 297, at 1368. 
 364. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2013) (“In representing a client, a 
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.”). 
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authority to withdraw NTAs, even if legally insufficient, that already 
have been filed with the immigration court. 365   Instead, once 
jurisdiction vests with the court, the trial attorney can only file a 
motion asking a judge to administratively close or terminate 
proceedings.  In short, ICE attorneys have insufficient tools and 
incentives to decline to prosecute removal proceedings early on in 
appropriate cases. 
 The problem could be addressed through implementation of a 
policy requiring that ICE lawyers screen all incoming cases before 
proceedings are initiated in immigration court.366  If trial attorneys are 
to be assigned cases, either individually or as a team, before they are 
filed, it would be most appropriate for that particular attorney (or 
group) to consider whether the NTA should be filed with the court.  If 
trial attorneys are not assigned to individual cases until further along in 
the proceedings (such as at the first master calendar), then prefiling 
NTA review should be made by any attorney in the office who might 
be responsible for the case shortly down the line.  This would increase 
the likelihood of careful review and help facilitate the exercise of 
independent judgment. 
 It is true that a trial attorney sometimes may have insufficient 
information before a case is filed to determine whether a dismissal or 
other step back is warranted.  Still, in many cases the equities will be 
ascertainable from documents in the A-file, which may include the 
noncitizen’s length of residence, immigration history, medical records, 
employment and tax records, criminal history, country of origin, and 
so on.  Oftentimes it will be apparent at the outset whether the person 
would appear to be a good candidate for discretion.  In close cases, 
trial attorneys could give respondents an opportunity to provide 
additional information, ideally with the assistance of counsel who has 
had the opportunity to review nonconfidential information in the 
government’s A-file.  At a minimum, giving trial attorneys greater 
screening responsibility would give them the incentive to review NTAs 
for insufficiency and error, and the ability to quickly get rid of those 
that should not be in court at all. 
 Another reform that should be considered is whether to increase 
ICE attorneys’ authority to independently dismiss cases, even after 
they have been filed.  Under the current system, trial attorneys who 
wish to decline to pursue a removal case that is already under the 
                                                 
 365. 8 C.F.R. § 239.2 (2014). 
 366. To File or Not To File a Notice To Appear:  Improving the Government’s Use of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 175, at 60 (making this recommendation). 
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jurisdiction of EOIR can exercise discretion to file a motion, but then 
the immigration judge must adjudicate whether to administratively 
close the case.367  To be sure, immigration judges often grant such 
motions, especially when the noncitizen supports that outcome.  After 
all, immigration judges seek to clear their dockets and in fact are 
subject to case completion goals.368  Because immigration judges may 
deny motions to close proceedings for any number of reasons,369 
however, trial attorneys may hesitate to screen cases carefully once 
filed with the court.  Should ICE have increased authority to dismiss 
removal prosecutions even after jurisdiction has vested with the 
immigration court? 
 Here again, recourse to criminal practice is useful.  At common 
law, even after the filing of formal charges, prosecutors were generally 
allowed to withdraw from continuing to prosecute.370  Concern over 
unbridled nolle prosequi power led many jurisdictions to implement 
judicial or legislative rules requiring prosecutors to at least explain 
their reasons for dropping a prosecution in writing.371   In some 
jurisdictions this requirement attaches after formal indictment, while in 
others prosecutors are free to drop prosecutions without giving a 
reason up until a preliminary hearing.372  The federal rule, like that of 
many states, requires a judge’s leave to dismiss an indictment.  But as a 
leading case has instructed, “The exercise of [the executive’s] 
discretion with respect to the termination of pending prosecution 
should not be judicially disturbed unless clearly contrary to manifest 
public interest.”373 
                                                 
 367. In re Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688 (B.I.A. 2012). 
 368. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-771, EXEC. OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW:  CASELOAD PERFORMANCE REPORTING NEEDS IMPROVEMENT 4 (2006). 
 369. In Avetisyan, the BIA set forth factors for the immigration judge to weigh in 
ruling on a motion to administratively close proceedings, including (1) the reason 
administrative closure is sought; (2) the basis for any opposition to administrative closure; 
(3) the likelihood the respondent will succeed on any petition, application, or other action he 
or she is pursuing outside of removal proceedings; (4) the anticipated duration of the closure; 
(5) the responsibility of either party, if any, in contributing to any current or anticipated delay; 
and (6) the ultimate outcome of removal proceedings (for example, termination of the 
proceedings or entry of a removal order) when the case is recalendared.  See Avetisyan, 25 I. 
& N. Dec. at 696. 
 370. See DAVIS, supra note 28. 
 371. 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 329, § 13.3(c). 
 372. Id. 
 373. United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975); see also 4 LAFAVE ET 
AL., supra note 329, § 13.3(c) n.44 (discussing the requirements for judicial approval of nolle 
prosequi). 
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 In essence, then, a criminal prosecutor’s early decision to 
withdraw a pending prosecution will generally be granted unless the 
reasons given somehow violate manifest public interest, but judicial 
scrutiny increases as proceedings progress.374  Some variation of these 
rules could be workable in immigration court, too.  Trial attorneys 
could be required to file a written statement explaining why an NTA is 
being withdrawn, and immigration judges could retain the power to 
reject that action in proceedings where doing so would be at 
significant odds with the public interest, for example if the noncitizen 
appears to have recent and serious criminal convictions or to be a 
threat to national security.  At some point, perhaps at the first master 
calendar or other hearing, trial attorneys would lose the authority to 
independently cancel NTAs (subject to scrutiny).  At that step, trial 
attorneys would need to make a motion to administratively close 
proceedings. 
 Increasing ICE prosecutors’ power to dismiss so that it more 
closely resembles the nolle prosequi norms in the criminal system 
would help facilitate just outcomes in many removal proceedings.  
This is especially true if the current system continues, in which other 
officials can initiate proceedings without the input of ICE prosecutors.  
In tandem with a move towards vertical prosecution, trial attorneys 
should screen at an early stage all cases that they will have 
responsibility for handling in the event that an adjudicative hearing 
occurs.  If the attorney knows they will be accountable for the case 
down the line, there is an increased incentive to more carefully review 
the merits of prosecution earlier in the proceedings.  The ability to 
quickly dispose of cases at the outset that in the trial attorney’s 
independent judgment should not be pursued will help reduce 
excessive caseloads and allow them to focus on the cases that matter 
most.  At the very least, the existing system generates delay and 
inefficiencies, as in many cases all concerned parties believe judicial 
dismissal to be appropriate. 
 To be sure, enhancing the trial attorney’s power to decline 
prosecution after proceedings have commenced would slightly reduce 
the immigration judge’s authority.  But under the measures suggested 
in this Part, the encroachment would not be significant, since 
immigration judges could retain the authority to reject ICE’s 
withdrawal of a removal prosecution if clearly contrary to the public 
interest.  It would also be time-limited; at some point along the 
                                                 
 374. 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 329, § 13.3(c). 
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progression of proceedings ICE could only make a motion to 
administratively close, subject to immigration judge approval, as is the 
case now. 
 For these reasons, DHS should implement a rule or policy 
requiring that its trial attorneys review all NTAs before they are filed 
with the immigration court.  Additionally, the Attorney General should 
consider amending existing DOJ regulations to provide that, even after 
jurisdiction vests with the immigration court, trial attorneys have the 
authority to cancel NTAs through written submission to the court, for 
legal insufficiency or for any reason, unless determined by the 
immigration judge to be clearly contrary to the public interest (and 
subject to some cutoff point such as the first appearance).  Again, 
enhanced responsibility and authority to decline cases, whether before 
or after the commencement of proceedings, will work best in tandem 
with a system of vertical prosecution. 
D. Prehearing Case Conferences 
 The life of most criminal cases begins and ends before ever 
reaching trial.  The vast majority of criminal prosecutions are resolved 
through plea agreements or (to a much lesser extent) motion practice.375  
In this scheme, prehearing conferences are critical to giving the parties 
the opportunity to communicate, negotiate, and resolve cases. 
 Current agency regulations contemplate prehearing conferences 
in removal proceedings.376  The Immigration Court Practice Manual 
also specifically sets out procedures for meetings of this kind.377  In the 
real world, however, these pretrial conferences do not frequently occur.  
Immigration judges rarely schedule them with parties.  Savvy 
attorneys typically must file motions in order to request a prehearing 
conference and then wait for the immigration judge to adjudicate the 
motion and schedule the conference, perhaps far in the future.  And of 
course, nothing ensures that the trial attorney who appears on behalf of 
                                                 
 375. See Roberts, supra note 311 (explaining the need for the right to effective 
assistance in plea bargains in light of the fact that very few criminal cases proceed to trial). 
 376. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.21(a) (2014) (“Pre-hearing conferences may be scheduled at the 
discretion of the Immigration Judge. The conference may be held to narrow issues, to obtain 
stipulations between the parties, to exchange information voluntarily, and otherwise to 
simplify and organize the proceeding.”). 
 377. Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, The Immigration Court Practice Manual, 
DOJ 82-83, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/Practice_Manual_1-27-14.pdf# 
page=67 (last modified June 10, 2013); see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 324, at 
653-54. 
 
 
 
 
2014] JUSTICE IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 75 
 
the government at a pretrial conference will be ultimately responsible 
for the case. 
 As in many criminal prosecution systems, respondents in 
immigration court should have the opportunity to confer with 
knowledgeable, accountable trial attorneys before any hearing on the 
merits.  This would facilitate the exchange of information, narrowing 
of issues, and potential settlement of cases.  In addition, and 
importantly, prehearing conferences would encourage trial attorneys to 
look at cases more closely before the eve of trial.  If vertical 
prosecution were also implemented, trial attorneys would be better 
incentivized to take advantage of a prehearing opportunity to gauge the 
strength of the noncitizens’ case and potentially narrow the issues in 
cases they will likely be responsible for down the line. 
 Some noncitizens may not wish to engage in prehearing 
conferences and should be permitted to decline to request such 
meetings, so as not to waste ICE attorneys’ time.  Moreover, 
prehearing conferences could often be of value without immigration 
judge supervision, thus limiting their impact on the overall operation 
of the adjudication system.378 
 This reform should be accomplished through rule making by 
DHS or the Attorney General.  Alternatively, DHS could institute an 
internal policy of offering prehearing conferences, or immigration 
judges could make a practice of encouraging parties to employ the 
existing practice manual provisions.  But, without an enforceable 
default rule, workload and enforcement pressures—as well as 
traditional practice—will push against prosecutor participation, despite 
the overall efficiency gains promised by prehearing communication.  
The better course would therefore involve adopting a formal and 
mandatory rule rather than mere managerial policy. 
E. Resource Objections 
 Some will raise objections to these proposed reforms based on 
resource constraints.  As an initial matter, the strength of those 
arguments turns on how much we value the justice-seeking norms that 
the system currently fails to provide.379  Our country’s legal standards 
                                                 
 378. However, if supervision by the immigration judge is required or desired, there 
would need to be a sufficient buy-in for this reform because the court might need to maintain 
a separate pretrial calendar. 
 379. Several DHS policies enacted or expanded under the Obama Administration 
suggest that it is sometimes willing to undertake policies that prioritize the administration of 
justice despite increased bureaucratic complexity and expense, including Morton’s 
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largely bespeak a strong commitment to fair dealing and getting things 
right.  Accordingly, adding mechanisms to further those values in 
institutions where they are not yet fully realized is an endeavor the 
government may wish to undertake, even where doing so is not 
costless. 
 But the economic argument, even taken on its own terms, may 
not pose a persuasive objection.  Under the current system, noncitizens 
win the right to stay in roughly 50% of cases in which ICE seeks a 
removal order.380  Additionally, a sizeable number of persons ordered 
removed eventually win their cases on appeal.381  And if, as studies 
have suggested, fewer noncitizens in removal proceedings were 
unrepresented or subject to detention, there is reason to expect the 
government would prevail in even fewer cases.382 
 It would be ludicrous to suggest that the system must have a 
100% success rate, but when one of every two cases fails to result in a 
removal order, scarce resources clearly are being expended on some 
removal prosecutions that should not have been pursued in the first 
place.  With the addition of procedures to encourage earlier screening, 
accountability, and information flow, many of those cases would rise to 
the surface more quickly, releasing those persons from the hardships 
exacted by the system and freeing up the government to go all in on 
the cases that matter most.  Seen in this way, the cost of implementing 
the additional procedures considered in this Part is likely offset by 
gains in efficiency, as well as in justice. 
 In terms of numbers, deporting one person likely costs the 
government somewhere between $12,500 and $23,480.383  Additionally, 
                                                                                                             
prosecutorial discretion initiative and the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program.  
See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), USCIS, http://www. 
uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last updated 
Sept. 9, 2014). 
 380. ICE Targeting:  Odds Noncitizens Ordered Deported by Immigration Judge, 
supra note 181.  This figure is up from the already high percentage of cases in which ICE was 
unable to convince immigration judges to order removal between FY2001 and FY2010, 
which averaged around 25%. ICE Seeks To Deport the Wrong People, supra note 182, fig.1 
& accompanying tabular details. 
 381. See Letter from Crystal Souza to Thomas Striepe, supra note 186 (presenting data 
on noncitizen appeals to the BIA that are remanded or sustained); Becker & McDonnell, 
supra note 171 (citing sources discussing erroneous detention and removal of U.S. citizens); 
see also Rosenbloom, supra note 109, at 146-53 (discussing errors in removal proceedings 
leading to wrongful deportations). 
 382. See Markowitz et al., supra note 169. 
 383. See Jana Kasperkevic, Deporting All Of America’s Illegal Immigrants Would 
Cost a Whopping $285 Billion, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 30, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.business 
insider.com/deporting-all-of-americas-illegal-immigrants-would-cost-a-whopping-285-billion-
2012-1#ixzz2kd8kUJ2b (contrasting the ICE deputy director’s 2011 statement to Congress 
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deportations generate expenses beyond those to the federal 
government.  For example, a recent report estimates that if noncitizens 
in detention had access to a lawyer, New York State would save nearly 
$2 million annually through reduced spending on public health 
insurance programs, foster care services, and lost tax revenue, while 
employers would save an additional $4 million annually by avoiding 
turnover-related costs.384  These figures do not suggest that deportable 
noncitizens should never be deported.  They do, however, bolster the 
arguments for adding measures that heighten prosecutorial scrutiny of 
the merits of pursuing removal early in every case—ideally before 
charges are ever filed—in the interests of accuracy, efficiency, and 
equitable considerations. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 The current removal adjudication system allows trial attorneys to 
prosecute removal with little regard for their duty to see justice done.  
For many noncitizens, the government’s charges trigger mandatory or 
discretionary civil detention, in which noncitizens are transferred to 
prison-like conditions (or actual prisons), far from family and 
community support.  The case then joins a massive backlog and waits, 
often languishing for over a year before the immigration judge finally 
reaches the merits of the government’s prosecution, and sometimes 
lingers years more before the noncitizen’s eligibility for relief is finally 
assessed. 385   Many respondents are unable to access counsel or 
evidence during this time, and even if they are able to find 
representation, attempts to communicate or negotiate with ICE before 
a hearing may be futile.  Noncitizens potentially eligible for 
adjudicative relief from removal might be offered the opportunity to 
close the case just before their individual hearing and on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis.  Due to the government’s vast informational advantages 
and the prosecutor’s potential nondisclosure of any evidence in the 
noncitizen’s favor, the deal might seem worth it even though it leaves 
the noncitizen in perilous limbo.  Those perseverant individuals who 
do venture to a hearing—pro se if they cannot afford an attorney or 
                                                                                                             
that the cost of deportation per person is $12,500 with a 2010 report by the Center for 
American Progress finding the cost to be $23,480). 
 384. See The New York Immigrant Family Unity Project:  Good for Families, Good for 
Employers, and Good for All New Yorkers, CENTER FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY 5, 10-14, 
http://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/immigrant_family_unity_project_print_layout.
pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2014). 
 385. Immigration Court Processing Time by Outcome, supra note 136. 
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find pro bono counsel—may face a prosecutor willing to capitalize on 
any mistake, advantage, or vulnerability in order to secure a removal 
order.  This system simply cannot be characterized as consistently 
producing just results. 
 The agency should continue to encourage and train its attorneys 
to exercise discretion consistently and to litigate cases in ways that 
develop full and fair records.  But it also should recognize that ICE 
prosecutors operate under significant pressures, including an 
omnipresent concern for national security and massive caseloads.  
Accordingly, as with criminal prosecutors, the overall performance of 
trial attorneys would benefit from concrete procedural rules that 
increase their accountability and incentives to seek justice.  Four 
workable reforms could make a difference right away:  vertical 
prosecution in all offices, improved access to trial attorneys through 
prehearing conferences, enhanced power to screen and decline cases, 
and heightened disclosure obligations.  While the procedural rules 
discussed in this Article would not fully rectify the harshness and 
inefficiencies of the current removal system, they are realistic reforms 
by which the Executive Branch can reshape the role of ICE 
prosecutors in a way that benefits all participants in the immigration 
system, and the nation as a whole. 
